Mou Zongsan, Nineteen Lectures

Posts Tagged ‘Mou Tsung-san Nineteen Lectures

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san), Nineteen Lectures: English Translation, A Note (1)

A note from Julie Wei
July 4, 2012

Summary

Mou Zongsan’s Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy (zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang) has been translated into English by Julie Lee Wei.  After having it peer-reviewed, Columbia University Press decided in 2010 to publish it.  Publication is on hold, however, pending settlement of a copyright dispute.  The following leading scholars of philosophy have read all or part of the translation, and have expressed the opinion that the translation is, apart from any questions of copyright, worthy of publication:

Roger Ames
Stephen Angle
John Berthrong
Cheng Chung-ying
Jaegwon Kim
Victor Mair
John Makeham
Stephen Palmquist
Wei-ming Tu
Yang Xiao

—jlw

(All items on this website were first posted in 2012.  Note 2 was revised Feb. 2013.  All are re-posted unchanged on Dec. 30, 2013.)

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san) Nineteen Lectures, Lecture 11, Excerpts

[The following is excerpted from Mou Zongsan, Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy, Lecture 11, “The Principal Issues in Wei and Jin Metaphysics, Xuanxue, and Their Metaphysical Content and Value”, translated by Julie Lee Wei.  Mou’s lecture itself was translated by Wei in 2000, the endnotes in 2002.  Mou’s English words are underlined. Words between asterisks are revisions or notes added in 2010-2012.  The term xuan, Dark, is used because Mou has said specifically that xuanxue, Dark Learning or Wei-Jin metaphysics, is not what is meant by metaphysics in the West. The discussion of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoist “Nothing, Non-Being” is continued from Lecture 5 (see excerpt). Copyright©Julie Lee Wei, all rights reserved.]

339

The individuals known as “mingshi”[i] are a unique phenomenon of the Wei-Jin period. The principal players of the pre-Qin period are the “zhuzi baijia”[the various philosophers and the hundred schools].  Peculiar to the Wei-Jin period are a breed of men known as mingshi [literally "Men of Note," noted for their untrammeled style and spirit and their Pure Conversation].  The Confucians of the Song-Ming period are called lixuejia [School of Reason-Principle Learning or Neo-Confucians, also translated Rationalists].  In Buddhism the principal players are the senglü and heshang, or monks.  In each period the principal players are called by different names, which are determined by the content of their teachings.

The mingshi represent a very special breed who express the creativity of the period and are a very amusing group.  Being an inevitable product of that age, there was a genuineness about them, and men like them were never again to appear in subsequent ages.  Although the mingshi of that era were by no means great men, they were nevertheless inimitable.

340

Now what exactly is a mingshi?  Generally speaking and based on the development of their style, a mingshi had first of all to be able to engage in “Pure Conversation” [qing-tan].  Pure Conversation did not simply mean pleasantly passing the time in conversation.  It had to have a specific content, which meant that the talk had to be about the sanxuan  [*Three Dark, or deep, mysterious, Subjects*; Three Metaphysical Subjects] of Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, and Yi Jing [Lao, Zhuang, Yi]. There was also a specific manner in which Pure Conversation was conducted.  One did not talk in a scholarly or pedantic fashion.  In the terminology of the age, one had to “tanyan weizhong 談言微中” [make a point, *hit the mark*, subtly in conversation, be witty].  Tanyan weizhong meant that one had to use a few pithy phrases to make a point, *hit the mark*,  aptly and elegantly.  Pure Conversation was also attended by specific postures.  Most of the mingshi liked to engage in Pure Conversation holding a whisk (duster) in the hand, which was a matter of stylishness.  Later, stylishness developed into a search for elegance in conversation.  Dullness in conversation and a repugnant countenance were to the mingshi intolerable.  Hence they also stressed beauty of appearance, which is to say they stressed beauty.  Only he whose conversation could meet these standards in content, manner, and style could be called a mingshi.

The mingshi was a standard of value during that era, particularly the Eastern Jin [317-420] period.  Only those who qualified as mingshi could be counted the aristocrats of that era.  And only they could associate with and become candidates for marriage with the contemporary aristocracy.  However, the mingshi was a personal expression.  Mingshi-hood was a standard of value for one’s personal status in society.  Within the families of those mingshi, Confucian propriety and morality [lijiao, *“ritualist teaching”*] still governed family rules and family tradition.  Here then arose a conflict:

341

The Confucian ethos has moral self-cultivation as its foundation, as in “From the Son of heaven to the commoner, they all have moral cultivation as their foundation.”[ii]  But since the mingshi did not cultivate themselves morally, how could they teach others to cultivate themselves morally?  Thus we can see that the strict family rules and family traditions only adhered to external rites and customs and not to the spirit of Confucian lijiao [propriety and morality]. They only adhered to the appearance of the ritual system. Lacking was the spirit of the system, for the spirit of the era rested with the mingshi. There was a fundamental conflict here, a conflict involving life itself.

Beginning from the Wei-Jin period [220-420], a new concept emerged in Chinese society, the concept of mendi [pedigree].  Mendi referred to the aristocracy.  This concept of pedigree continued its hold on men’s minds to the extent that later on in the Tang dynasty [618-907] even the emperor Tang Taizong [r.627-650] felt inferior to several of the great families of the time.  The concept of mendi did not appear prior to the Wei-Jin period.  Emperor Gaozu [206-194 BCE] of the Han dynasty, who rose to the throne from the position of a commoner, appointed his ministers through a system of selection and recommendation of the deserving.  In the turbulence of the Wei-Jin period, this system fell into disrepair, as a result of which it was replaced by the system of “nine grades of the upright” [jiupin zhongzheng].  This gradually evolved into the concept of mendi, out of which a new aristocracy was formed.  Mendi represented a value system, just as mingshi and Pure Conversation represented a kind of value system.

We can use another example to explain “tanyan weizhong” [making a point with subtlety].  Once Wang Yan asked Ruan Xiu:  “The Sage [Confucius] talks about mingjiao [orthodox Confucian teachings], while Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi talk about ziran [being

342

natural]. What is the difference between mingjiao and ziran?”  If we were to answer in the scholarly way by adducing evidence, that would not be Pure Conversation. Ruan Xiu answered aptly in three simple words: “Jiang wu tong 將無同” [In Nothing same, or, They are the same in Nothing]. This was a great delight to Wang Yan, who immediately made him a “yuan” [administrator].  This is the famous story known as “the three-word administrator.”[iii] The three words “jiang wu tong” [In Nothing same] on the one hand make no assertion that Confucian propriety and morality and Taoist naturalness are necessarily the same, and on the other hand neither do they assert that the two are necessarily not the same; in other words they mean that mingjiao and ziran are not necessarily contradictory.  This sort of repartee is a kind of sly humor.  This is not the language of science or logic, which is why Mr. Tang Junyi [1909-1978] calls it a heuristic language, a very good description, as it is a language that hints at rather than asserts.

As to the question of Confucian propriety and morality and Taoist spontaneity, the lives of individuals in the Wei-Jin period show that in some individuals the two are contradictory while in others the two are not contradictory.  For instance, Ruan Ji [210-263] said: “How could propriety [li], have been established for me?”[iv]  That shows that the two are in conflict.  Then there was Yue Guang [d.304] who said: “Propriety contains its own joys. Why do they have to do that?”[v]  That shows that the two are not in conflict. “Jiang wu tong” [In Nothing same] hints at the latter state.  Only those who engaged in Pure Conversation in this fashion could be considered mingshi, a type of personality that was never again to appear in later ages.  The self-proclaimed mingshi of the late Qing [1644-1911] and early Republic [1912-] era are really spurious mingshi, far too inferior to

343

the mingshi of the Wei-Jin period.  Each age has its own unique type of individual.  For as the saying goes,

Each age produces its own men of genius,

Who each dazzles for several hundred years.

[Jiangshan dai you cairen chu 江山代有才人出,

Ge ling fengsao shubai nian 各領風騷數百年.

The product of the Wei-Jin period was the mingshi, who although not rising to the loftiest state, yet possessed authenticity, and their lives contained a certain inevitability.  From the perspective of the Confucian and judged by the ultimate vision of man’s life, there was behind the facade of the mingshi considerable desolation and pathos. Life not being simple and smooth, these mingshi all met tragic ends.  Ruan Ji was the only one who managed to hold on.  Most of the others were executed and thus came to a bad end. Because Wang Bi [226-249] was still too young, he did not get dragged into the political vortex. Otherwise he too would hardly have escaped the same fate. This has led me to the thought that the intellectuals of China have their own destiny.  Only through their own vigilance and exertions will they be able to preserve their proper destiny and fulfill their own nature. They must not only look to others for understanding and tolerance.

The antecedent of Pure Conversation [qingtan] was the Pure Discussion [qingyi] of the latter part of the Eastern Han [CE 25-221] dynasty.  Pure Conversation and Pure Discussion were different in that each reflected a different age.  In Pure Discussion, scholars discussed and criticized politics, representing public opinion.  This later led to

344

the Party Persecution Calamity [danggu zhi huo, *Party Proscription Calamity*].  Because the intellectuals’ participation in politics brought about the *proscription* of political parties and its tragic denouement, later intellectuals dared not criticize contemporary politics, and as a result developed Pure Conversation, whose content consisted of the sanxuan [Three Obscurities, Three Metaphysical Subjects].  For the moment we will not get involved with such extraneous issues as the influence of Pure Conversation on society and politics, but will simply look at the principal issues of Wei-Jin xuanxue-type of metaphysics itself, as well as its value and contribution.

From an objective intellectual point of view, Wei-Jin metaphysics had a principal topic, namely the issue of “huitong Kong-Lao” [reconciling Confucius and Lao Zi].  Wei-Jin was a period that propagated Daoism, and philosophical discussion took Lao Zi [6th ? cent. BCE] and Zhuang Zi [ 369?-286? BCE] as its norm.  Nevertheless, Confucius’s position was not erased, which is to say that the Sage’s position was already established by that time and could not be denied.  This, however, led to a problem, which was the aforementioned apparent conflict between Taoist spontaneity [naturalness, freedom] and Confucian propriety and morality.  Since Lao-Zhuang [Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi] stressed freedom and Confucianism stressed propriety and morality, this was then the problem of a conflict between Confucianism and Daoism.  This was an objective issue in intellectual history, one which developed at this stage of intellectual history.  Once this issue emerged, it could not be ignored, and thus the problem of how to reconcile Confucianism and Daoism became the principal issue.

Since Lao-Zhuang became the philosophical standard and the position of the Sage could not be denied by anyone, how then was the position of the Sage as Sage [shengren]

345

to be explained?  According to the general understanding, the Sage occupied the position of the Sage by virtue of his ability to manifest Dao in his own person.  “The Sage” is an honorific, an appellation for someone possessing virtue.  Only someone who manifests Dao in his own life, someone who has reached the state where “the Heavenly Principle circulates,” can be counted a sage [shengren].  If so, then what is the “Dao” that the Sage  realizes in his own person?  Men of the Wei-Jin period held that this Dao was none other than the Dao taught by Lao-Zhuang.  This then immediately afforded an opportunity to reconcile the conflict between Confucius and Lao Zi, and this is where the Wei-Jin philosophers took their cue.  In this way, the reason the Sage was a sage lay in the fact that he could fully manifest in his life the “Dao” taught by Lao-Zhuang.

This kind of integration started with Wang Bi.  Pei Hui [Pei Wei] once asked Wang Bi why, since Dao is wu  [*Without*, Nothing, Non-being], the Sage did not teach it whereas Lao Zi on the other hand stressed it particularly? Wang Bi gave an answer that was both very clear and very clever. Wang Bi said: “The Sage embodied and realized wu [Nothing, *Dao*] and since wu cannot be explained, he did not speak about it.  Lao Zi embodied you [Being] and so he talked tirelessly of that in which he was deficient.”[vi] “The Sage embodied wu [ti wu]” means that the Sage realized wu in his life.  Ti means realized and manifested, in other words, practiced in his person.  It is the ti of “ti er you zhi體而有之” [personally practice and possess it]. The ti of the later Buddhist concept of “ti fa kong” [embody the emptiness of dharmas] also derives from this meaning.  “Nothing” [wu] must be personally realized and not verbally explicated, and therefore the Sage did not speak of it.  And what about Lao Zi?  By the remark that “Lao Zi embodied you” [Being], Wang Bi means that Lao Zi is still in the state of Being and is unable to

346

manifest the state of Nothing. This shows that Wang Bi’s valuation of Lao Zi is far lower than his valuation of Confucius. Lao Zi can only explain Nothing and explains it quite correctly. But in the discipline of practising it, he is still in the state of Being, which means he is still unable to reach the state of transformation [hua]. As the saying goes,

He who is great and transformed [hua] is called sagely,

He who is sagely and transcends knowledge is called godly.[vii]

One who has attained the state of being “great and transformed” is no longer in the state of “Being.” 

What do we mean by “in the state of Being”?  Zhuang Zi said: “Fishes forget one another in stream and lake, men forget one another in the art of Dao.”[viii] Only when man’s mind and soul is in a state of forgetfulness *[hunran, dissolving and transcending comparisons and distinctions between one another such as big/small, long/short, this/not-this, good/bad, beautiful/ugly, each returning to oneself, to one's own proper nature and proper portion (see Mou, Material-nature and Xuan Principles, 才性與玄理1993, 183-184]*, will the natural springs of action [tianji] and the natural bent [tianqu] emerge.  That is why Zhuang Zi also said: “When one’s infatuation and desire are strong, one’s innate nature is weakened.”[ix]  Not only this, but one who is strong in wile [jixin機 心, *machinations*] is also weakened in the innate nature.  To be always in the midst of anxious calculation is a painful thing, and one has to transcend it sometimes so that one may rise above the state of self-consciousness.  To transcend self-consciousness does not mean that one is not self-conscious but that it is a state of transformation [hua]. Not having reached the state of transformation means that one has not yet reached the state of the innate nature and natural tendency, which means that one cannot as yet xiangwang [be forgetful of others, or transcend comparisons and distinctions between self and other].  In one sense, the Chinese are the most human-relations-bound of all people,

347

one with the most difficulty in being forgetful of others.  To be strongly bound by human relations makes one feel warm and cosy to be sure, but it is also at times irksome. Zhuang Zi believed that if Dao prevails in the land, it will be possible for people to be forgetful of one another.  But when there is no Dao in society, then people will seek their own kind and join with their own party.  Then unable to forget one another, they will live in pain. However, if being strongly bound by human relations like the Chinese is irksome, then does it mean that Western people, who give little heed to human relations, are in a state of “forgetting others”?  You will be mistaken if you think this is so. This kind of comparison is what Buddhists call “xiangsi fa liu相 似法流” [dharmas of resemblance], an error.  Since both are incorrect, it goes to show that “Men are forgetful of one another in the art of Dao” is a very lofty mental state.   The ordinary person can sometimes manifest this state, as if he has Dao, but as soon as motives of interest enter in, it will be impossible to be forgetful of others, and this will be a state of “unenlightenment” [wuming].  As long as unenlightenment is not eradicated, Nothing will not be able to emerge, and that person will not qualify as a sage. That is why Wang Bi said that “Lao Zi is one who is in the state of Being”, which means that Lao Zi has not ceased to be unenlightened, and has not yet reached the state of Nothing, of forgetting one another.  Therefore he “talks tirelessly about that in which he is deficient.” It is because he is deficient that he stresses it, which is typical of human nature.

It is essentially with these brief words that Wang Bi integrates Confucius and Lao Zi.  Since only the Sage can manifest Dao, the Sage is a person of the first rank.  In the “Table of Men of Past and Present [gujin renwu biao]” of the Han Shu [History of the Han Dynasty], men through the ages are divided into nine grades, with the Sage

348

belonging to the first grade and Lao Zi belonging to the fourth grade.[x] This shows us that although the Wei-Jin period promoted Daoism, it by no means denied the position of the Sage. This was how the Sage was viewed in every period of Chinese history.

This leads to yet another concept, namely the concept of “Perfect Teaching” [yuan jiao, Perfect Doctrine].  If the Sage manifested Nothing [wu] without talking about it, then how did he manifest it?  He manifested Nothing in his everyday practical life and not by going into the deep mountains and secluding himself.  But was not “Being” [you] in his everyday life?  Where would “Nothing” [wu] be?  Nothing was in the midst of it, Dao was in the midst of it.  Using the terminology of the time, the practical everyday life was ji tracks, while Nothing was ben, root, grounding, *ground*.  This then is the Theory of Tracks and Grounding [*Tracks and Ground,* jiben lun].  This was a new concept introduced by the Wei-Jin period.  The theory of tracks and grounding originated with Wang Bi and prevailed for a very long time, extending to the period of the Northern [386-535] and Southern [420-589] dynasties.  Wang Bi used this theory to reconcile the contradictions between Confucianism and Daoism.

On the surface, the life of the Sage consisted completely of tracks.  If there were any signs of seclusion, it was only in the earliest stage of self-cultivation.  When he reached the true state of sageliness, his life was completely inseparable from practical existence.  But although inseparable from tracks, he was able to take Nothing as his grounding, as a result of which he succeeded in putting his life on a harmonious and solid footing. His whole life being inseparable from tracks and immersed in tracks is what the Daoists call wu bu wei [nothing not do, i.e., doing everything].  On the other hand, nothing not do has to have wu wei [doing nothing (against nature)] as its grounding, in

349

other words, wu wei er wu bu wei [doing nothing yet doing everything], namely Nothing serving as the grounding for practical life.  Generally men have only tracks but no grounding, as a result of which they are ordinary men and not sages.  Herein is hidden the concept of Perfect Teaching.  Later on, the Perfect Teaching of Buddhism also derives from this concept, which is called “the perfection of tracks and grounding” [jiben yuan].  In Guo Xiang [d.312 CE]’s annotation of Zhuang Zi he talks about jiming [ji, tracks, *the Manifest, or propriety and morality*; and ming, the Dark, *or deep, mysterious, silent nature; the true nature*],”[xi] which also means the same thing.

In Guo Xiang’s annotation of Zhuang Zi, who represents jiming yuanrong, tracks and the hidden perfectly dissolved and fused?   It is Emperor Yao [legendary ancient sage-king].[xii]  Yao represents Perfect Teaching, the highest model of the human being, the sage.  Xu You, Wu Guang[xiii]  and others do not represent the highest state.  Most people when they read the “Roaming” [Xiaoyao you] chapter in Zhuang Zi believe that Zhuang Zi’s intention is to exhalt Xu You.  In fact Xu You does not make the mark; he can only qualify as Hinayana [the smaller vehicle in Buddhism], a biased type, biased towards the ming [Dark, i.e., deep, Nothing, side].  Only Yao can represent the state of Perfect Teaching [fusing Nothing, transcendence, and Being, immanence or being of this world].

Then there is the concept of “tian xing” [heavenly punishment] mentioned in the “Symbols of Virtue Fulfilled” [De Chong Fu] chapter.[xiv]  And in Zhuang Zi’s the ”Great Ancestral Teacher” [Da Zongshi] chapter Confucius calls himself “a victim of heaven” [tian zhi luming 天之戮民].[xv]  ” Who can be released whom heaven punishes?” is looking at Confucius from the point of view of Shushan Wuzhi.  Shushan Wuzhi belonged to the biased and extreme type of Daoism. Based on this, it would still be

350

difficult to determine whether Zhuang Zi was using the model of Perfect Teaching to exhalt the Sage.  At the least, Guo Xiang’s annotation of Zhuang Zi went a step further by introducing the concept and state of Perfect Teaching.  This represented a new development, opening up a new philosophical vista.  This development cannot be termed an error, nor did it violate the original meaning of Daoism, for Lao Zi also spoke of “he guang tong chen” [merge with its glare, blend with its dust].[xvi] Chinese philosophy is always both transcendent and immanent, with the two integrated, which is the mode of Perfect Teaching.

Reconciling the contradictions between Confucius and Lao Zi by means of the theory of tracks and grounding and the mode of Perfect Teaching was the principal philosophical issue of the Wei-Jin period.  From the perspective of intellectual history, there was indeed at the time the question of whether Confucianism and Daoism were in conflict. And once this question emerged it could not be ignored, and so it became a major issue.  For example, in the Southern and Northern dynasties period [420-589] and the Sui-Tang period [589-907] the principal issue was the absorption of Buddhism.  To the Confucians of the Song-Ming [960-1644] period the issue was how to confront Buddhism and Daoism and propagate Confucianism, while in our own period the question is how we should integrate Chinese culture with Western culture.  Each is the principal issue of its period.

From here we can go a step further and look at the contribution of Wei-Jin xuanxue [Dark Learning, metaphysics]. The content of xuanxue consists of the metaphysical principles of Daoism. The contribution of Wei-Jin metaphysics was to develop the metaphysical principles [xuanli, literally Dark, deep, mysterious, Principles] of Daoism

351

one step further.  Intellectually, xuanli represent a very high state. To understand their contribution, we must first of all have a correct understanding of these principles and make a careful analysis of them.

The present age is fond of talking about analysis, but no matter what analytical method we use we must first grasp two basic principles: First, no matter whether we agree with it or not, we must first clearly analyze the original meaning of the text in order to arrive at a correct understanding of it.  Second, if those questions are not altogether vacuous and absurd, then our analysis must not ultimately analyze away the question.  In general British and American scholars of analytic philosophy do not observe these two conditions, with the result that most of them end up by analyzing away the question.

For example, ever since Wittgenstein, the philosophers who analyze language like to use the analysis of solipsism as an example (the solipsism centered on the neural system), then drawing the conclusion that solipsism is meaningless.  This is to analyze away the question.  Is solipsism indeed meaningless?  Russell once said that all philosophy is “philosophy under a hat.”  All those particulars that are perceived by us are inseparable from the egocentric.  Recent epistemology has taken this as its point of departure, focusing on how those particulars emerging from the egocentric acquire objectivity, how they can be externalized, objectified.  This is also the question dealt with in Kant’s epistemology.  His discussion of the category is to enable subjective representations to involve the object.  Russell’s realism also begins with this question, a very important one in epistemology.  Kant and Russell each have a different method of analysis, and different answers, but they did not cancel out the question, they did not

352

analyze away the question.  If the question is to be analyzed away, then why do we need the question at all?

The questions of Chinese philosophy are also different from the speculative questions in Western philosophy.  A speculative question may be entirely wrong, while the subjects of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism are all intensional truths.  An intensional truth cannot be totally wrong.  Speculative questions can easily produce illusions.  For example, the antinomy criticized by Kant consists of a number of illusions.  But Kant still maintains that such illusions are natural and unavoidable, and therefore they must always be clarified by critical philosophy.  Such illusions are rare in Chinese philosophy. You may say that you do not understand Confucius’s ren [humanity] and Lao Zi’s wu [Nothing, Nothingness, Non-Being] at all, but you cannot say they are illusions.  Thus in analyzing these questions, we should analyze and define them objectively and correctly, and we must not analyze away the question.

I am not against analysis, and I am even in favor of everyone having some training in analysis.  But we should not merely promote analysis, exhalt analysis.  Analysis is a kind of work that has to be done.  Questions should be discussed and analyzed.  Russell’s Principia Mathematica deals solidly with questions and is not just propaganda or promotion.  Analysis is not something that is easy.  It requires solid discipline. When appropriately employed, analysis is a great aid in dealing with questions. The most difficult kind of analysis is Kant’s critical analytic. Russell, following the tradition of Leibniz, stressed logical analytic, which is comparatively easier.

353

With this kind of tradition behind them, the British know how to analyze and how to do it fastidiously.  This represents the British character.  To this manner of analysis I have given a name, “ delicate and clever” [xianqiao纖 巧].  On the positive side, it is indeed skilful, like using a fine knife to carve wood, where arduous carving produces something very delicate, but something that at the slightest touch can break into pieces and disappear. So from another side, something so extremely fine will produce problems.  That is why I prefer not to take this road, preferring rather the Kantian analysis of the eighteenth century, which won’t get us into trouble.

Although the analytic philosophers maintain that analysis is only a method and does not espouse any doctrine, in fact it is a doctrine in itself.  Behind it stands a constraint, namely the teaching, doctrine, they espouse.  That is why the result of their analysis is either the distortion of the original meaning, or the disappearance of the question. Whenever they analyze a few statements by Hegel, they will usually make Hegel the object of their derision.  But are Hegel’s statements indeed meaningless?  That sort of attitude is wrong, where they do not seek an objective understanding but first jump to the conclusion that the other position is meaningless, where they have turned their subjective lack of understanding into objective meaninglessness.  This is just illogical, and is simply not analytic.  Wittgenstein’s thought was likewise exquisitely clever.  Highly gifted in logic and exceptionally strong in philosophical intuition, he was often capable of making incisive statements, but all the same he does not impress one as a great philosopher.  This sort of analytic philosophy has its allures, however, and once you are seduced, it will not be easy to shake off its charms.  All the same, a solid training in analysis is good and should be undertaken.

354

The trend these days [1978] is to show the delicate and clever.  If philosophy wishes to lead the age, it should not roll along with it.  Rather, it should discover its flaws and make corrections.  For Chinese philosophy to produce new developments, it must first obtain a correct understanding of the issues, and a proper understanding calls for a thorough analysis, but without analyzing away the issues.  If we do this step by step, new questions will arise naturally, for new questions do not rise out of a vacuum.

With respect to xuan metaphysical principles, they are xuan principles when looked at objectively, but when looked at subjectively they are metaphysical wisdom.  Xuanli and xuanzhi [metaphysical principles and metaphysical wisdom] are inseparable.  The wisdom in xuanli is none other than xuanzhi.  This is the unique contribution of Daoism.  From here we can go on to look at the question of integrating Confucianism and Daoism.

As previously mentioned, Yue Guang said: “There is joy within propriety and morality itself; why do they have to do that?”  This statement seems to have reconciled the contradictions between naturalness [ziran, spontaneity, freedom] on the one hand and propriety and morality [mingjiao] on the other, but if we look closer, we will see that it really cannot integrate the two, for there is a hidden contradiction here.  Likewise with “Jiang wu tong” [they are the same in Nothing]. For “wu” [Nothing, without] is common to both, and can be explained by either school.  To use wu to integrate the two is passable but not complete.  The Sage has also said: “When does heaven ever speak? The four seasons revolve, the myriad things are born. When does heaven ever speak?”[xvii]  He also said: “I shall be without [wu] surmise, without insistence on certainty, without inflexibility, without ego.”[xviii]  The Book of History [Shu Jing] says: “Without [wu] leaning and slanting, without contriving to love good… without contriving to hate evil.  Without

355

bias, without partiality, the Way of the King is wide and open.  Without bias and without partiality, the Way of the King is level and smooth.”[xix]  The Shijing [Book of Poetry] says: “The heaven above carries all without [wu] sound or smell.”[xx]  All of which shows that Confucianism can also discuss wu, but wu cannot exhaust the Sage’s Way [Dao].  Since both schools can discuss wu, I shall use a Buddhist term to describe wu as a common principle, a “shared dharma” [gongfa].  God may also be explained by means of wu [Nothing], but God is not wu.  Confucianism can also discuss wu, but wu is not the substance of Confucianism.  Not only this, but even Buddha-womb [Ch. Rulai zang, Skt.tathagatagarbha, womb, embryo, of Buddhahood] and Brahman can similarly be explained by means of wu.  From this we may see that wu has no unique definition or determination.  Hence it is common, and therefore we call it a “common principle.”

The ontological substance of Confucianism is “ren” [humanity, humaneness].  Nothing [wu] is a spiritual state in which ren is manifested.  Clearly this is a question with two levels.  Ren pertains to the being, ontological level, and wu to the functional [*soteriological, subjective state of mind*] level.  These two levels must not be confused.  Daoism’s strength lies in the functional level.  It has fully elaborated on the principles on this level without touching upon other questions. This is the basis of the school of thought and its distinctive character. That is why I have often said that in a certain sense Daoism is strong in philosophical flavor and weak in doctrinal flavor.  In philosophy universality is stressed, and the questions posed by Daoism has this kind of universality, which is why we say that it is strong in philosophical flavor.  But since it is universal and shared or common, then we cannot use it to integrate it with Confucianism, for it would not resolve the issue.

356

Therefore the question has two levels:  the ontological-level question is the warp, and the functional-level question is the woof.  Both levels are present in Confucianism, whereas only the functional level question or the woof is present in Daoism.  Daoist metaphysical principles and metaphysical wisdom both appear on the functional level.  Questions on the ontological level cannot be xuan [dark, profound, mysterious] and cannot contain paradoxes [diaogui],[xxi] for the ontological level is concerned with objective-reality principles.  Cheng Yichuan[1033-1108] and Zhu Zi [Zhu Xi, 1130-1200]  both said: “There is nothing more real than li 理 [reason, Principle, Universal Truth] in the world.”  The metaphysical principles and metaphysical wisdom represented in paradoxes are all expressed on the functional level.  The statements of the Chan [Zen] sect of Buddhism can express both levels, for example, “It is mind that is  Buddha” [ji xin shii fo 即心是佛] points to the ontological level, while “Not having a mind is Dao”[wu xin wei dao 無心為道] points to the functional level, to prajñā-wisdom.  All paradox in Buddhism is expressed in prajñā wisdom.  The Emptiness principles [kong li, the teaching that phenomena are empty of ontological substance] of Buddhism are in themselves not metaphysical principles, but the reasoning that expresses prajñā-wisdom is metaphysical principles.  Since Daoism only emphasizes the aspect of xuan metaphysical principles [xuan li] and xuan metaphysical wisdom [xuanzhi], its main contribution also lies in its introduction of the mental state on the functional level.  The metaphysical principles expressed in paradoxes are very striking in Zhuang Zi, namely in the so-called “outlandish theories, profligate statements, and capricious terms.”[xxii]  The prajñā-wisdom of Buddhism is also expressed in paradoxes, and also belongs to reasoning on this level.  Prajñā is a common principle to be acknowledged by both

357

Mahayana and Hinayana, and there are distinctions of higher and lower mental states.  In this sense, the metaphysical principles and metaphysical wisdom that are peculiar to Daoism are also a common dharma. Thus after Daoism was promoted through Wei-Jin xuan metaphysics, xuanxue, Chinese philosophers were immediately able to accept Buddhism, the first to be accepted being the metaphysical principles and metaphysical wisdom of prajñā.

As to method of expression, xuanli and xuanzhi and prajñā are all common dharmas, belonging to the functional level of “Not having a mind is Dao.”  In the terminology of the Wei-Jinperiod, it is called “jiming yuan” [the perfection of *the manifest and the hidden*]. Ming [dark, hidden] is the aspect of wu wei [without doing *(anything against nature)*, without contriving]. The aspect of wu bu wei [nothing not do, do everythng] is the aspect of tracks, *the manifest*.  Using the terminology of the prajñā sūtras [Wisdom sūtras], it is ”Not jeopardizing the False  *[Provisional]* Names [jiaming, things of the  phenomenal world] and speaking of the Real Form [shixiang, realness] of dharmas.”[xxiii]  Real Form [shixiang] refers to the unseen grounding [ming]; and “not jeopardizing the False  *[Provisional Names]*” refers to tracks [ji]. The Daoist contribution lies in fully developing the perfect fusing [yuanrong] of this jiming [*tracks and the hidden*]. It is necessary that we squarely confront this contribution on the functional level, and by doing this we will have exceeded the traditional attitude. The Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties were unable to solidly face this xuanli and xuanzhi of perfect fusing, and of course they also opposed the prajñā-wisdom of Buddhism, with the result that they looked upon it as heresy.  Today if we are able to

358

squarely face the contribution of Wei-Jin philosophy, namely the Daoist contribution, then we need not adopt this attitude. (See Lecture 7 on the question of the two levels.)

From the method of expressing Daoist metaphysical principles and metaphysical wisdom and the wisdom of Buddhist prajñā, a new question emerges, namely the question of analytical [fenjie] discourse and non-analytical discourse.  If we wish to analyze Chinese philosophy, we should also understand this question. Generally speaking, all of Western philosophy is expressed analytically, whatever the type of analysis, whether it be critical analysis, logical analysis, or linguistic analysis.  Ever since Plato, Western philosophy has stressed the analytic, with the “non-analytic” that I am talking about here appearing rarely.  In China, it was the Daoist ZhuangZi who made a formal allusion to the question of analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse.  Lao Zi still belonged to the analytical mode.  In Buddhism, Śākyamuni Buddha in the beginning taught in the analytic mode, and called it discriminating or differentiating discourse [fenbie shuo  or chabie shuo].  But at a certain stage it was necessary to teach through the non-analytical method, and consequently Buddhism formally introduced the question of analytical discourse [fenbie shuo] and non-analytical discourse [fei fenbie shuo]. This was the Buddhist contribution. The non-analytical mode of expression as found in Zhuang Zi and Buddhism simply does not appear in Western philosophy. That is why the contribution of Chinese philosophy to this area is larger, whereas the contribution of Western philosophy is larger in the analytical area.  Although Hegel adopts the dialectical method and not the analytical method, the process in which he demonstrates his dialectic is expressed in the analytical mode.  This is still far different from the non-analytical mode expressed in Zhuang Zi or prajñā.  Hegel’s dialectical

359

method must also be squarely faced; it is also very significant.  But if we wish to make a full study of the analytical method and the non-analytical method as a formal, objective question, we must do it through Chinese philosophy before we can arrive at a thorough understanding of this huge realm of reasoning.  This is a new question that emerges when we in the present age discuss traditional philosophy.

For us to understand this realm of reasoning, it is necessary that we face the paradoxes in Zhuang Zi and the prajñā sūtras.  We cannot dismiss them lightly, nor can we make frivolous claims that they belong to the sphere of logic.  Take, for example, the statement “Prajñā is not prajñā, that is called prajñā” [Bore fei bore, shi zhi wei bore 般若非般若是之謂般若].[xxiv]  If you think this is simply two propositions in which “prajñā” has two different meanings, and so they do not contradict each other, nor violate logic, then you will decide that this sort of paradox does not fall outside the sphere of logic.  This line of thinking would be mistaken, for the statement is not a proposition at all and cannot be explained as propositions.  A proposition has its boundaries and its meaning, made very clearly in analytic philosophy. The world of the proposition is the world of science.  Consequently anything that can be expressed as a proposition can be clearly stated.  The value and meaning of man’s life cannot be expressed in propositions, and so they do not belong to the world of propositions and lie outside its sphere.  This is Wittgenstein’s claim, one that is very significant and suggestive.  Since logic falls within the sphere of propositions, then according to Kant and Hegel logic belongs to the sphere of understanding.  God does not belong to the sphere of understanding.  His understanding is also different from that of man, it being divine understanding.  Of course, with respect to the universality and all-encompassing nature of logic, even God

360

cannot be contrary to logic.  He does not create evil nor does He create contradiction.  However, from another point of view, only God is most universal and most transcendent.  This “universality” then is obviously different from the universality of logic; this tells us that the analytic and the non-analytic must be discussed separately.

If we are able to squarely confront the two different questions of the analytical mode of discourse and the non-analytical mode of discourse, then we can dissolve the taboo of the Neo-Confucians of the past.  Confucians can also talk about the aspect of wu. We should not brand Wang Yangming [1472-1528] a Buddhist just because he made statements in this area.  That would be wrong and unfair.  The level of non-analytical discourse is a common dharma, of which all are allowed to speak.  For example,  Cheng Mingdao [1032-1085] said: “Heaven and Earth’s constancy is mindless [wu xin, without mind], its mind encompassing all things [天地之常,以其心普萬物而無心]; the sage’s constancy is heartless [wu qing, without feeling], his heart following all affairs.”[xxv]  This is a paradox, but it is also contained in the Dao of the Sage. “Heaven’s constancy” is an ontological question. “Is mindless, its mind encompassing all things” is simply “Being mindless is Dao.”  By speaking on both levels together, a paradox is formed.  We should not say that it comes from Buddhism and Daoism as soon as we see this sort of paradox.  Confucianism can also touch this vast realm of reasoning.

The main contribution of Wei-Jin metaphysics is that it trains people to value the non-analytical aspect of reasoning, which is not an easy thing to do.  Even Hegel’s dialectical method is not easy to understand, much less this kind of metaphysics taught in Daoism or prajñā which goes a step further and which is even less easy to understand.  However, it is also very important, and requires that we all make some effort to grasp it.

361

In this lecture we have described two questions:  one the contemporary issues of Wei-Jin metaphysics, and one the content and value of Wei-Jin metaphysics itself.  Once we enter into an understanding of this, then we will be able to know some of the new questions that can develop out of Chinese philosophy.  That will then contribute to the development of both Chinese and Western philosophies. (Mou, Nineteen Lectures, 1983, pp. 227-243.  Original Chinese transcribed and edited by Hu Yi-hsien, with original notes in Chinese by Hu Yi-hsien.)


[i]See Mou Zongsan, Caixing yü Xuanli 才性與玄理(Material-Nature and Xuan Principles] (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju , 1974) , ch.3, sect. 1, “The Emergence of the Mingshi.”

[ii]See Da Xue [The Great Learning] 1.6, “Text of Confucius.”

[iii]See Shi Shuo Xin Yu [New Account of Tales of the World] 4, “Wenxue”:  “Ruan Xuanzi 阮宣子 (Xiu修) was a man of excellent repute.  The taiwei [Grand Marshall]  Wang Yifu 王夷甫 (Yan衍) met with him and said:  ‘Are Lao-Zhuang [Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi] similar to or different from the Sage’s teachings?’ Wang replied:  ‘Jiang wu tong 將無同[In Nothing same, or, Perhaps Nothing same i.e.., they are the same in Nothing].’  The taiwei was pleased with his reply and appointed him an administrator.  This became known as the three-word administrator.’”  Elsewhere in the Jin Shu [History of the Jin dynasty], the names are given as Ruan Zhan 阮瞻 and Wang Rong 王戎.  See  Jin Shu, juan 49, “Biography of Ruan Zhan ”:  “Rong asked him:  ‘Since the Sage stressed mingjiao [names and moral teaching], while Lao-Zhuang elucidated ziran [spontaneity], were they making the same point or were they making different points?’  Zhan said:  ‘Jiang wu tong‘[In Nothing same].  Rong exclaimed and sighed over this, and then commanded that Wang be employed.  People called him The Three-Word Administrator.”

[iv]Jin Shu, juan49, “Ruan Ji  Zhuan” [Biography of Ruan Ji]:  “Once, when Juan’s older brother’s wife set out to visit her parents, Ruan went to say goodbye.  When criticized for this he said: ‘How could propriety have been established for me?’”

[v]Jin Shu, juan43, “Yue Guang Zhuan” [Biography of Yue Guang] :  “At that time Wang Cheng, Hu Mu , Fu Zhi  and the others lived abandoned lives as a form of being362enlightened, even to the point of doing such things as going about naked.  Guang smiled when he heard of it, saying:  ‘Why do they have to do that when mingjiao[names and moral teaching] has its own pleasures?'”[vi]See San Guo Zhi [Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms], juan 28, “Zhong Hui Zhuan,“ [Biography of Zhong Hui], annotation quoting “Biography of He Shao and Wang Bi “:  “Wei…asked Bi:  ‘If Nothing is indeed that on which the myriad things rest, why is it that the Sage does not speak about it whereas Lao Zi propounds it ceaselessly?’  Bi replied  ‘The Sage embodies Nothing [makes Nothing his substance] and because Nothing cannot be explained, he doesn’t talk about it.   Lao Zi is one who embodies Being, and so he talks tirelessly about that in which he is deficient.'”  See also Shi Shuo Xin Yu 4, “Wenxue“.[vii]See Mencius 7B.25.7.

[viii]See Zhuang Zi  6, “Da Zongshi “ [The Great Ancestral Teacher].

[ix]Ibid.

[x]Han Shu  [History of the Han Dynasty], juan 20, “Gujin Renwu Biao” [Table of Personages Past and Present] 8.

[xi]See Zhuang Zi, Guo Xiang’s annotation.  For example:  “…[The sage-king]Yao is ming [in silent agreement with nature], his tracks follow Yao…”

[xii]See Zhuang Zi, “Xiaoyao You” [Carefree Roaming], the section “Yao abdicated in favor of  Xu You”, and Guo Xiang’s annotation.

[xiii]Zhuang Zi, “Wai Wu [External Things]” chapter:  “When Yao gave the empire to Xu You, Xu You fled from him.  When Tang gave it to Wu Guang, Wu Guang was angry with him.”

[xiv]Zhuang Zi, “De Chong Fu“ [Symbols of Integrity Fulfilled] chapter:  “Lao Dan [Lao Zi] said:  ‘Can we simply remove the distinction between death and life, and between the permissible and the impermissible, so as to unfasten their clamps and fetters?’  Wu Zhi said:  ‘Heaven has imposed these punishments.  How can they be unfastened?’

[xv]Zhuang Zi, “Da Zongsi” chapter:  “Zi Gong said:  ‘However, what method will you, Master, rely on?’  Confucius replied: ‘I, Qiu, am one of the multitude who will be slaughtered by heaven.  All the same, I shall share the government of the state with you.’

[xvi]See Lao Zi, chapters 4 and 56: “Blunt its sharpness, resolve its confusion, merge with its glare, blend with its dust.”

363

[xvii]Analects 17.19, “YangHuo” :   “Confucius said: ‘I wish to be without words.’  Zi Gong  said:  ‘If you do not speak, what are we to transmit?’  Confucius replied:  ‘When does heaven speak?  The four seasons move along, the myriad things are born.  When does heaven ever speak?'”

[xviii]Analects 9.4, “ZiHan”:  ‘Confucius renounced four things: Wu yi, wu bi, wu gu, wu wo  “ [I shall be without surmise, without insistence on certainty, without inflexibility, without ego.]”  Translation by James Legge.

[xix]See Shang Shu  [Book of History], “Hong Fan[The Great Plan]” chapter.

[xx]See Shi Jing [Book of Poetry], “Da Ya [Greater Odes], WenWang [King Wen]” chapter.

[xxi]Zhuang Zi, “Qi Wu Lun [On the Equality of Things]” chapter: “‘I, Qiu, and you are both dreaming.  When I say that you are dreaming, that is also dreaming.’  This kind of talk is called diaogui [paradox].”

[xxii]See Zhuang Zi, “Tianxia [All Under heaven] chapter.

[xxiii]See Boro Jing [Prajñā Sūtra. i.e., Maha-prajnaparamita Sutra], “San Hua 散華” chapter, number 29.

[xxiv]Jingang Jing [Diamond Sūtra]:  “Buddha spoke of prajñā pāramitā which is not prajñā pāramitā which is named prajñā pāramitā.”

[xxv]See Er Cheng Quan Shu  (Complete Works of the Cheng Brothers), Mingdao Wenji [Collected Works of Mingdao], juan 3:  “Reply to Mr. [Zhang] Hengqu’s ‘Letter on the Fixity [Determinateness] of Human Nature.'”

(Copyright©Julie Lee Wei, all rights reserved.)

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san) Nineteen Lectures, Lecture 5, Excerpts

[The following is excerpted from Mou Zongsan, Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy, Lecture 5, “The Metaphysics, Xuan Principles, of Daoism”, translated by Julie Lee Wei.  Mou’s English words are underlined. Lecture 5 was translated by Wei in 2000.  Words between asterisks were revised or added by Wei in 2010-2012.]

138

We have already observed that the rise of Daoism and the character of the system were determined by the question of the origin of the zhuzi [various philosophers], namely, that they were directed at the exhaustion of Zhou institutions.  With this concept in mind, we will proceed to discuss the doctrines of Daoism.  First of all, we may ask, “How should the idea of Dao be understood? How should wu [Nothing, Nothingness, Non-Being] introduced by Daoism be understood?”  In the next step, in understanding the relationship of wu [Nothing, Nothingness, Non-Being], and you [Being], how is you to be understood?  In the third step, how do we understand the relationship between wu and you and wuh [things, entities].  By means of these three levels of understanding we shall be able to reveal the entire character of Daoist doctrine.

If someone were to ask, “What is the meaning of the Nothing [wu] that Lao Zi talks about?”, how should we answer him?  This would require that we have a good understanding of the life of Chinese culture and the wisdom it has produced.  The wisdom produced under this cultural environment is different from the wisdom and thought produced under the Greek environment or under the Indian environment. Therefore we have to hew close to the life of the culture when we speak of a philosophy and not just speak out of a vacuum……

………….

139

To understand why Lao Zi’s wu [Nothing, Nothingness] emerged in the Warring States period, we must take a vertical view of the cultural background.  All questions of this kind have a timelessness; all truth has the universality of truth.  Don’t think that just because that happened two thousand years ago it is irrelevant today.  Today’s situation is still a Warring States period.  Ancient Chinese civilization reached its zenith in the Spring and Autumn [Chunqiu, 722-481 BCE] and Warring States [Zhanguo, 489-222 BCE] periods.  According to Oswald Spengler [1918-1922], every people has a “nineteenth century”, this “nineteenth century” being a figure of speech.  The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were a nineteenth century, for example.  According to Spengler’s theory of cultural extinction, every people can only have one nineteenth century, can only bloom once.  Examples are Greece, Rome, and modern civilizations; once having bloomed, they decline and perish.  That is why his book was named The Decline of the West.  From the history of the cultural development of the West, it is easy for Westerners to hold this view.  In China, rise and decline are not a big issue; if there is rise there must also be decline, making a wave-like continuity, the one producing the other endlessly, always spiraling forward.  From the perspective of physical life and biological life, there is indeed only one bloom.  But cultural life is different.  It can spring up and find a transcendent basis from which to enrich and revive our physical life, and thus it can continue forever.  This would not give you a theory of cultural extinction.  A nineteenth century can appear, and appear endlessly, a prospect which can only be understood and grasped with a vertical [historical] consciousness……..

…………

140

What, then, do you think the Daoist wu was directed at?  How do you go about understanding this idea?  “The myriad things under Heaven are born of you (Being); you is born out of wu.” *(Dao De Jing, ch. 40).* Wu is Nothing, Nothingness. In Western philosophy, the idea of nothing also appears in logic and ontology, but there with a totally different meaning.  If you understood the cultural background of Lao Zi, you would know that wu is a simplification and a generalization, and that what it originally brought up was wu wei [without doing, i.e. without doing (anything against nature)] “without artifice”. Wu wei was directed at you wei  *[have doing; doing (against nature)]* “artifice”.  Lao Zi objected to you wei.  And why?  It was because of his particular occasion [situation], which we can only understand if we keep close to my previous statement that the various schools of philosophy “were directed towards the exhaustion of Zhou institutions”.  You wei meant artifice. According to the Daoists, as soon as there is zaozuo, artifice, there will be unnaturalness, unease, pretense, and falsity.  “Zaozuo” is close to English artificial, man-made or contrived.  Wu wei was primarily directed at this.  Its unique moment was the exhaustion of the Zhou wen [culture, institutions].  By the time of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the ritual and music, the codes, conventions and institutions established by the Duke of Zhou [Zhou Gong] had become a hollow shell because of the corruption and degeneracy of the aristocracy.  They became shackles and chains in people’s lives. Thus the Duke of Zhou’s ritual, music, codes, conventions, and institutions all became external or formal.  Ritual and music devoid of real life were artificial, false, external, formal, all these attributes emerging.  Only the external, which is not rooted in our lives and which cannot be internalized, can be chains on us.  Being that issues from our lives cannot fetter us.  Thus Daoism looked upon Zhou

141

codes and conventions as bonds, since all external, empty formalities are artifice [you wei], all bonds and shackles to our freedom and ease.  It was in this context that Lao Zi brought out the idea of wu wei [not doing; without artifice].

Wu wei belongs to the realm of a high-level spiritual life.  It does not mean inaction. Westerners and people in general translate it as inaction [budong], which completely misses the point.  Wu wei implies being natural.  The Daoist “natural” is not the natural of the natural world, nor is it the “natural” in the West’s naturalism.  Naturalism is close to materialism; it is a kind of materialism, for it refers to the natural world of natural science.  What the natural sciences study are all physical phenomena, and their “nature” refers to the nature of the world of physics.  According to Western religion, nature is created, encompassing all the finite creations of God, while God Himself is super-nature, with nature and supra-nature counterpoised.  The natural of the Daoists pertains to the spiritual life, meaning free and at ease, as oneself, not leaning on anything.  At present we only know how to borrow the old Chinese phrase ziran [*thus-of-itself, autonomous,* natural, spontaneous] to translate the Western idea of “natural”, while we have forgotten the meaning of this phrase which we already had.  Here is a twist that we should unravel and return the word to its original meaning *[thus-of-itself, autonomous]*.  The Daoists’ ziran meant being free and at ease, as oneself, not dependent on anything, and spiritually freestanding.  Only when one is independent in spirit can one be counted as free; so we see it is a very lofty vision.  All the phenomena of the natural world that Westerners talk about, strictly speaking, are taran [*thus-because-of-others,* heteronomous], other-dependent, are dependent on other things to be thus.  All the phenomena of the natural world belong in the realm of cause-effect relations, mutually dependent, which is

142

precisely not ziran, self-thus [self-existing, as oneself], not zizai [in the self], at ease, but are other-dependent.  And so Zhuang Zi [c.369-c.286 BCE] talked about roaming and non-dependence.  In reality, how can there be any non-dependence?  For example, when we sit we need chairs, when we are hungry we need food.  These all belong to what Westerners call natural phenomena.  The natural that Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi speak of does not have this meaning; it means as-oneself, non-dependent. That is why when wu wei *[literally, without doing]*, without artifice, is explained as implying the natural, it immediately reveals how special its meaning is.  It is directed at the exhaustion of Zhou institutions, at the external, false, formalities. Only by being liberated and delivered from them can one be natural.  Being natural requires that we rise to a higher state of non-dependence.  It was with these connotations that the Daoists used the phrase wu wei.

Wu wei is then universalized, abstracted, and distilled into wu [have not, there is not]; wu should be seen as a verb first.  What it negates is dependence, falsity, artifice, the external, and the merely formal.  Rising above them, it reveals a state without artifice, wu wei  *[there is not doing (anything against nature)]*, which of course is on a higher plane.  So from the very beginning wu was not an ontological concept but a practical concept pertaining to daily life.  This is a question concerning our life, and not a theoretical, metaphysical question.  In the broad sense, all questions concerning man’s life are practicalWu is an idea related to the practical. Wouldn’t you agree that it is very easy to understand?  Because culture in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods developed problems, the Daoists saw right away that people’s lives had descended into pretense and artifice, with the greatest loss of ease. It was very hard being exhausted from rushing around for one’s survival and from living in an empty framework

143

of pretense and form.  Christianity was the first to give us the idea of original sin, Buddhism the first to give us karma and avidyā [ignorance, unenlightenment].  What Daoism first gave us did not have to reach so far.  What it first gave us was right before our eyes, and that was artifice.  Pretense and artifice were most responsible for taking away men’s freedom and ease.  Towards this, the Daoists had genuine susceptibility, so-called existential susceptibility.  From this point of origin we could talk about original sin, and about karma too, for no matter how heinous the sin, this was the problem. The freedom and ease that was like floating clouds and flowing water that the Daoists spoke of required enormous discipline [gongfu, work/effort] and represented a very lofty vision. This vision was reached only with maturation and after being finely tempered. Clearly it required enormous discipline because from this perspective life was very vexing.

Take the idea of jinchi矜持[standing on ceremony, stiff formality], which the Confucians also talk about.  The Neo-Confucian Xie Shangcai [1050-1103] spent his whole life trying to be rid of this jinchi, which shows how difficult it was.  Jinchi means to be artificial and unnatural [not at ease].  And who can be free of artifice and jinchi? It’s a phenomenon that’s a pain in the neck to everyone.  It is like the Buddhists trying to be rid of avidyā [ignorance], achieved only when one attains Buddhahood.  The Daoists didn’t think it necessary to be so esoteric.  All that mattered was jinchi.  Get rid of it and you become a sage [shengren, holy man].  Isn’t that the same?  According to Daoism, jinchi was being artificial and unnatural.  If you could dissolve it, then you would be an Authentic Man *[Authentic Person]* [zhenren].  Daoism talked about wu [without artifice], and ziran [spontaneous, being natural, *of-oneself, autonomous*] from this level of the Authentic Man.  And so it is an idea pertaining to practice.  In our conduct of life, in human

144

existence, there is always a component of pretense and dishonesty, as false as the manmade diamond.  The Daoists were especially sensitive to this and from it developed a whole new doctrine.

If, after first understanding the idea of wu wei [be without artifice], we universalize it, we shall arrive at the idea of wu [*not have, there is no, without*, Nothing, Nothingness, Non-Being].  Looking at wu [not have, have no, there is no] as a verb, we can explain it with reference to the occasion, namely that it was negating Zhou proprieties [wen, culture], which in fact included everything.  Then we can remove this occasion and go forward:  Why does it oppose artifice? This we can probably explain on three levels. The lowest level is the rushing about in the natural *[physical]* life which takes away freedom and ease. Everyone has a practical, natural life where the rushing about causes it to flow out in all directions. This is the first level of life’s pain.  We see it clearly in the present world, where the modern person seeks stimulation in rushing about, and not finding satisfaction there, seeks then to numb the senses.  That is why Lao Zi said: “The five colors blind the eyes, the five notes deafen the ears, the five flavors rob [shuang爽] the mouth of its taste, the chase and the hunt but madden the heart.” (Dao De Jing, ch. 12). Shuang should be interpreted as “deficient” and “to lose”, such as shuang in shuangshi 爽失[lose] and shuangyue 爽約 [fail to keep a promise].  The confusion of the five colors blurs the eyes. To sum it up in present-day language, it means that with the rushing about in our natural *[physical]* life, our natural *[physical]* life flows away like horses galloping in all eight directions. Going one level higher, we come to the level of psychological moods such as instability in joy and anger. To fall into this level is also vexing. Going another step higher is the level of thought, where thoughts are contrived.

145

The calamities of the present world [1978] are primarily calamities of thoughts, totally the creation of ideology or ideological mind-sets.  For example, the emergence of the set of ideas known as communism has created division in the world, resulting in two worlds and two criteria for truth, a calamity of the highest order.  The contrivance of ideas is most vexing.  All the ideas derived from systems of thought are, broadly speaking, all contrivances of ideas.  The contrivances of ideas and systems of ideas represent only opinion and prejudice, and, to put it more politely, represent the knowledge gotten from a glimpse through a chink.  That is why any great doctrine has wisdom as its goal and does not offer knowledge.  The difference in wisdom is that it dissolves away knowledge, systems of ideas, and the contrivances of thought. All contrivances of thought are systems and are derived from a view through a chink; a bit of light comes from the chink, but the surrounding is darkness.  Only by dissolving it can there be all light, and this light is wisdom.  This is where Daoism talks about wu, where it does not talk about systems, but instead wants to dissolve away all systems. The rushing about in the physical life, the moods of the psyche, and further up, the contrivances of thought and so forth, are all systems, which must all be dissolved away.  Although the Zhou proprieties were supposed to adjust to the life of that age, they were after all only a system of codes, conventions, and institutions.  If we cannot find the rational, internal basis of the Zhou proprieties and merely look upon them as external, as merely an artificial system, then we should negate them.  This is how Lao Zi looked upon the Zhou proprieties.  Confucianism of course had a different perspective; that is why it said “Three hundred rules of ceremony, three thousand rules of demeanour without exception issue from human nature and human feelings.”  Nor does Confucius speak about wu (which does not

146

mean that he did not understand wu); instead he introduces the idea ren [humanity, humanness, benevolence] from the front.  Daoism negates the Zhou proprieties, expanding this view to speak about wu wei [without doing, without artifice], opposing wei [doing, artifice].  Putting it in present-day language, Daoists negated the three levels, namely the rushing about in the natural *[physical]* life, the moods of the psyche, and the contrivances of thought.  “The five colors blind the eyes, the five flavors rob the mouth of its taste” refers merely to the personal, momentary quest for sensations. The effects of the contrivances of thought, on the other hand, can be much greater, its roots deepest, and once flaring up can result in calamity.  That is why its place is on the highest level. The purpose of wu is to dissolve it away.

Thus, making wu [not have, have no, be without] a verb first is to negate all of this.  Once it is negated, a vision emerges before us, one expressed by the noun wu, Nothing. The noun wu, Nothing, taken apart is then turned into the phrase no-thing (there is nothing). So Nothing (no-thing) is not the nothing of ontology.  When we speak about ontology we are taking the position of Western philosophy, speaking about the ontology of the metaphysics bequeathed to us by Greece.  Wu does not have the ontological sense.  But when the wisdom of wu is thoroughly developed, it can also imply an ontology; that, however, would not be the ontology based on the West, but pertains to the practical, namely practical ontology.  All Chinese thought [xuewen] is practical; for example, the moral metaphysics of Confucianism is practical, in the broad meaning of practical.  In the language of Daoism, what practice manifests is described in such terms as release, being carefree, and without artifice, and when such wisdom totally breaks through, it can imply a practical ontology.  “Release [jietuo]” is more appropriate to Buddhism, and Daoism

147

did not have this term, although they had such terms as “being untrammeled [satuo]”, where the meaning is slightly different.  To sum it up, let us just use the word practical.  Once wisdom breaks through, and because there is nothing outside wisdom, then it has to give an explanation of heaven and earth and the myriad things.  Consequently there can be a practical ontology, which can also be called a practical metaphysics. This practical metaphysics, ontology, rests on the understanding of wu.

Having understood the origin of wu, how are we to understand wu according to the vision it has revealed?  This is the Dao [Way] that Daoism speaks of.  Dao is a commonly shared old term used by everyone.  Daoism seeks to understand and define Dao through wu; so wu is an important crux.  Wu alone won’t do either because within wu  [Nothing, Nothingness, *Non-Being*] there is also you [Something, Being].  So how are we to understand wu?  How are we to understand you?  How are we to understand wu and wuh [things, entities] on the one hand and you and wuh on the other?  We can discuss this on three levels. First separately understand wu, then separately understand you, then lastly understand the relation of wu, you, and wuh.

The Dao De Jing says: “Heaven and earth and the myriad things [wuh] are born of you [Being]; you is born of wu [Nothing, Non-Being]”, clearly explaining the relations of wu, you, and wuh.  When a statement like this appears, does it not give us metaphysics?  The purpose of metaphysics is to explain heaven and earth and the myriad things.  Western philosophy begins from existence, from ontology and epistemology, hence making wu, nothing, nothingness, an ontological concept.  Daoism goes about it differently; hence we cannot understand it via this approach, but must understand it from the human person’s life.  The state revealed by wu is, in Daoist terminology, xu [void].

148

“Being void, one, and calm [xu yi er jing虛一而靜]” is originally a statement from Xun Zi [fl. 298-238 BCE] (Xun Zi, “Jie Bi” chapter),*[see John Knoblock, Xunzi, 1994, 3:104*].  The Dao De Jing says: “Reach the void ultimate, maintain stillness absolute.” (Dao De Jing, ch. 16).  Void and calm being Daoist spiritual cultivation, Xun Zi’s statement comes from Daoism.  The state of wu is one of “void, one, and calm” [xu yi jing], meaning that one’s mind and spirit should not be attached to any one fixed direction.  The rushing about in life, the moods of the psyche, the contrivances of thoughts, all have a fixed direction.  Attachment to this precludes reaching through to that.  Your life attaches to this, my life attaches to that, each affirming his own truth, resulting in conflict and contradiction.  The attachment [zhizhuo] of Buddhism is this clinging, is to lock one’s thoughts into one fixed direction.  That is why the first step in analyzing and understanding wu is xu yi jing [being void, one, and calm].  Being void brings out the spirit’s liveliness [ling靈, spirit].  If the mind is attached to one fixed direction, then the mental life is blocked and filled with this one direction, and then it is no longer empty, and if not empty, then not spiritually lively [ling].  One [yi] means pure and unadulterated, without the mess and noise of conflict and contradictions, with existence fragmented and scattered.  Using Kant’s terminology, it is to dissolve the manifold, and not to integrate or unify the manifold, but to dissolve it so that it flows away.   Calm [jing] means not to be restless. Amidst a life of rushing about and the contrivance of thoughts, man is every day engaged in restlessness; once this is dissolved he will be calm. Daoism is fond of speaking of calm.  Confucianism frequently speaks of stillness, ding.  The Great Learning says: “When you know how to stop, then you will have stillness. When you are still, then you can be calm.  When you are calm, then you can be at peace. When you are at peace, then

149

you can ponder.  When you can ponder, then you can get results.”  It also speaks of zhen ding [true stillness].  The Buddhists speak of zhi[stop, rest]. Their meanings are interchangeable.  Calm [jing] is not the opposite of the motion and rest of physics, but is an absolute mental state.  It means stillness, or at any given time pulling the spirit out of reality, and letting it float in a higher, spiritual realm.  Nothing [wu], being natural [ziran], “void, one, and calm [xu yi er jing]” are all spiritual states, infinitely, marvelously, versatile spiritual states.

You see then that wu is not an ontological concept as understood in Western philosophy.  Kant, for instance, divides Nothing into four types, explaining nothing in terms of objective being or non-being, or in terms of an empty or non-empty concept  (see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Smith, page 294-296). Daoism does not explain it this way; hence we make the distinction.

Daoism attempts to understand the mental state of “void, one, and calm” through “infinite, marvelous uses”.  The spirit [ling] is Being that has infinite, marvelous uses.  If your mental state [xinqing] is limited by this, a given, direction, then you cannot use it somewhere else.  This is what is meant by “fixed use”.  Using a Daoist term, it is called li [function利].  In Lao Zi’s Dao De Jing, li and yong [use] are separate.  Chapter 11 says:  “You is li [function]; wu is yong [use].”  Li, function, is “fixed use”.  Yong is called “marvelous use”.  Whenever there is marvelous use it is infinite.  That is why there is the statement:  “Marvelous use has no direction.”  Direction [fang] means direction and place.  It is a spatial idea.  When employed in “xiaolian fangzheng” [filial, honest, square and straight], it denotes virtue and describes a moral character.  The statement “Marvelous use has no direction” takes the original meaning of fang [place, direction].  If

150

there is a fixed direction, then the use is no longer marvelous.  Li, fixed use, means a use that has a direction and is limited.  Marvelous use is infinite and directionless use.  Who can achieve this state of wisdom?  For instance, we who live in this difficult age can show whether we have self-cultivation, and whether our mind can be “void, one, and calm”, so that we may reflect clearly.  We should not be splintered by external distractions, and we should first of all reveal this state, this base.

The purpose of revealing this state is to enable you to respond to the world.  That is why wu wei [*not doing*, do nothing] is always linked to wu bu wei [nothing not do, do everything].  Only that which is of infinite marvelous use can deal with the exceedingly variegated world, which is why Daoism used to be called “the imperial science”, and whoever wanted to advise the sovereign had to study Daoism.  Zhang Liang [3rd cent. BCE] was the best example of this in history.  He was supremely intelligent, nimble of mind and clear of vision.  In the strife [c. 209-206 BCE] between the states of Chu and Han the principals in the fray were not always clear-sighted.  It was because Liu Bang [founder of the Han dynasty, 256-195 BCE] possessed a relatively flexible mind that he could finally gain victory. The Overlord of Chu [232-202 BCE] was said to have been so brave in battle that he could best ten thousand men; but because his mind was obdurate, he could not use Fan Zeng [277-204 BCE] even though Fan was in his employ. Nor was Liu Bang clear-headed, but as soon as Zhang Liang pointed things out to him, he could grasp the point and avoid making a mistake.  (See my Lishi Zhexue [Philosophy of History], part III, chapter 1).  How can there be certainty in any age? Events are dependent on people.  If you take the right path you will get good results, but if you take

151

the wrong path, you will get the wrong results. That is why it is most important to learn, to seek cultivation and training and rise to a higher level.

Hence the statement “Do nothing and nothing is not done [wu wei er wu bu wei].” (Dao De Jing, ch. 37).  “Nothing is not done” is the effect.  “Do nothing” [*not do*, wu wei] is the cause.  Once this is understood, we may advance a step and examine “you [there is, Being]“.  Daoism is very complete.  Wu [there is not, Nothing, Nothingness] is the essence, but we cannot just speak of wu, for it won’t do for life to be abstracted and suspended in nothing.  All three levels of wu, you, and wuh [things] must be taught before it is complete and reveals its entire use.

How does Lao Zi explain you [have, there is, Being]? At first you was also not the concept of “being” found in Western ontology.  It has to be approached from the mental state based on wu [have no, there is not, Nothing].  This state requires that attachments to any fixed direction must be dissolved.  But one cannot stop there, for then one would be suspended in emptiness.  This is simply an analytical way of expression.  To use Hegel’s terminology, this first step in understanding wu is wu in an abstract stage.  If we stop here, we would only understand the ontological nature of the abstract wu, namely its special nature as ground; in other words, we would abstractly understand the wu-itself, which is what Hegel called pure universality.

What is pure universality? Why can we use Hegel’s term to describe that stage of wu when it is suspended in a vacuum?  That is, why can we use pure universality to describe the wu that is an abstract stage?  Since wu is the ground, it can of course be universal; turning this into a noun gives us universality.  All ground has universality.

152

When we say that wu is pure universality we mean that it does not at this stage have content; it cannot be concretized but hangs in an abstract vacuum.  Without content wu is just “nothing itself”, just pure universality.  This is not Dao, and showing this is just for the sake of expediency.  We must go a step further and speak of you [have, there is, Being].  We speak of you when this pure universality comes in contact with concrete content.  It is concrete because there is content.  That is why we can apply the phrase “pure universality” to wu.

Then how are we to understand the concrete content “you”?  You is not Being outside ready to be stuffed inside.  For that would mean that wu is an empty framework that could be stuffed.  It is not very difficult to understand wu abstractly.  But understanding you is quite subtle.  Wu is a mental state that is void, one, and calm with infinite marvelous uses and very agile.  How can we see that its use is infinite and marvelous?  We can see it from youYou is the orientation of the mental state that is void, one, and calm and has infinite and marvelous uses.  Using the terminology of the Dao De Jing, it is the yaoxiangxing徼向性[want-direction, orientation].

The jiao 徼 in “Constantly have desire and thus to observe its want [徼jiao,yao]”– pronounced yao腰as in yaoqiu [request]—is the want [yao], of “yuanshi yao zhong 原始要終 [literally, investigate the origin and seek the end; investigate thoroughly from beginning to end.]” of the Yijing’s “Xici Xia [Appended Statements B]“. Once there is want, then there is an orientation [direction], namely a want-orientation.  Once a want-orientation, then there is a thrust.  The infinite, unlimited, mind is originally void, one, and calm, without sound or smell, without any signs or clues.  The want-orientation

153

represents a clue and sign, and this is where we speak of you [have; there is].  This is to speak of you, completely subjectively and with reference to the want-orientation of the unlimited mental state.  It is not speaking of you objectively.  The first chapter of Dao De Jing says: “Constantly reside in wu so as to observe its marvels; constantly reside in you so as to observe its want.”  The “Constantly reside in wu”[chang wu常無] is the mental state we have just described.  “Its marvels” refers to Dao.  Not only must the mind reside in the state of wu, so as to observe the marvels of Dao, but it must also often reside in the state of you, so as to observe the want-orientation of Dao.  Turning it around, we may say that the want-orientation is simply the you [Being] of Dao.  Dao De Jing approaches Dao through wu and you, for this is the double character of Dao.

Why does it have want-orientation?  Wu is not a lifeless thing.  On the contrary, it is an agile state of mind.  No matter whether this world exists or not, or whether there are the myriad events and myriad things or not, it can operate.  It can have a want-orientation without an object.  Even without a ready object, it can reveal a clue, a want-orientation.  Normally when we get an idea, we do not necessarily need an object.  The necessity of an object is the epistemological approach.  Sometimes we can suddenly, without an object, produce an idea from a root source.  This is creation.  The issuance of an idea is a want-orientation of the mind and spirit.  It is not want-oriented toward any object; rather, the object is created from this want-orientation.  This happens in our everyday life. Of course, at this level most of our ideas have objects, or at least are linked to objects.  Once we speak of creativity, it means that a want-orientation can be produced even without any links to an object; only this is called creating.  For instance, a writer can write when the inspiration comes even without having quotes from literature for every sentence.  He does

154

not always need quotes from others, but can even create his own quotes for others to quote.  That is why marvelous writings and marvelous thoughts can appear.

Generating you from wu is completely inner-generation, creative generation, in a way similar to what we have just described, when you does not arise in response to an object.  We can only say that you [Being] and wu [Nothing, Nothingness] constitute the double character of Dao when we approach want-orientation from the perspective of the mental state that has infinitely marvelous uses itself.  Wu is the ground and it must also produce the effect of want-orientation. This is how Daoism teaches you, and that is why it is very subtle.  If we approach it objectively from Being, no matter how xuan, profound, philosophers are, it would be intellectual profundity; in reality it is very easy to understand and not at all subtle.  These teachings of Daoism came out of the cultural life of China, produced out of the cultural background of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.  They are developed completely from the perspective of man’s life.  They are authentic, profound, and marvelous, and their functions are even more impressive.  The more complex man’s life, the higher the culture, the more they are needed.  Those who shoulder great responsibilities especially need these teachings, which is why they were called the imperial science.

Once a clue has an orientation, then there is an inclination to be a certain being [you], to become a being.  From this perspective, the Being of this orientation has creativity; hence it is not a Being of epistemology, but Being of practical ontology, which is to say, it is not the Being that is found in what Heidegger calls representative thought, but, going back a step, belongs to original thinking.  The Being in representative thought is a Being that is taken apart and diffused outward, that corresponds to the object.

155

There is a problem here, however.  If, once an orientation emerges and appears in you [Being], and the mind is not agile, then it will be confined here and not able to reach there; hence it cannot stop here, and this is where xuan [the profound, mysterious] appears.  Every want-orientation has a certain direction or orientation.  When the mind stops at this want-orientation, you leaves wu [Nothing, Nothingness].  You does not want to leave wu; it issues from the infinite versatility of wu, and once issued forth, dissolves and returns back to wu, constantly revolving in a circle.  Thus, we cannot talk about Nothing and Being separately and apart, for this circle must be seen as a whole.  When we speak of Nothing, it is also Being, and when we speak of Being, it is also Nothing, resulting in a kind of dialectical thinking.  Being which at the same time is not Being is Nothing; Nothing which at the same time is not Nothing is Being.  This appears to be a play of words, but only when one does not understand it.  If you understand it, the rules are very simple.  This circular revolving is then “xuan ” and it is the xuan of  “The xuan of the xuan [the mystery of mysteries], the door to the myriad wonders” of the Dao De Jing.

The xuan cannot be explained as clearly as in analysis.  Xuan means black.  Water when deep becomes black.  Thus xuan expresses the meaning of profound.  It also means  not as transparent and easy to understand as analysis, but somewhat obscure.  Actually, the xuan is neither easy to understand nor obscure.  Because analytical explanation must always follow the rules of logic, it is never xuan [obscure, mysterious] no matter how complex the subject.  Nothing that obeys the laws of mathematics and logic is xuan.   This is a distinction between major principles.  The xuan is a circle.  If we say it is Nothing, it is Nothing and also Not-Nothing, namely Being..  If we say it is Being, it is

156

Being and Not-Being, namely Nothing. Therefore, it is dialectical.  The dialectical is always xuan, and therefore profound.  If like a whip we move in one direction, the moving always moving, and the still always still, then the moving will forever move in a straight line, and there will not be anything xuan.  Only the dialectical can be xuan, can be profound, namely the xuan taught by the Daoists.  Therefore dialectics can only be applied to man’s practical, spiritual life; explaining it apart from this level would be all wrong.  Dialectical materialism discusses dialectics within the sphere of science and the material world, which is wrong. (See chapter 13 of my Logic [Lizexue]).

The xuan is profound and mysterious. The essential meaning of the profound is determined by the meaning of dialectics.  Dialectics is usually spoken of as a method, where only the process of its development is stressed.  Actually if analysis is dissolved, would not the meaning become one level deeper?  Since it is both profound and a mystery, then it is what the Dao De Jing speaks of as xuan. The first chapter of the Dao De Jing says: “These two issue from the same source but have different names. The same is that which is called the xuan. The xuan of the xuan [mystery of mysteries] is the door to the myriad wonders.” The “two” refers to Nothing and Being, the double character of Dao.  Nothing and Being both belong to the same source, getting their names, Nothing and Being, after they have issued forth.

Now we enter upon the third step: What is the relation of Nothing [wu] and Being [you] to the “things” [wuh] of “the myriad things of heaven and earth?”  Although Nothing and Being are explained subjectively, they are both absolute universal principles.  It is because they are absolutely universal that they can cover and involve heaven, earth and the myriad things. The Dao De Jing says: “Nothing names [is the name of] the

157

beginning of heaven and earth, Being names [is the name of] the mother of the myriad things.”  Heaven and earth are the overall name for the myriad things, while the myriad things is a way of speaking of heaven and earth when they are spread out.  Actually they are the same.  Speaking of the beginning of heaven, earth and the myriad things, they begin from Nothing.  If they began from Being, then Being would still begin from Being going back in an endless regress.  Therefore, either there is no beginning, or if there is a beginning, then it has to be Nothing.  So with regard to the beginning of heaven, earth and the myriad beings, we call it Nothing, and take Nothing as ground.  Thus the relation between Nothing and heaven, earth and the myriad things involves the myriad things turning backward, returning to its ground.  The next statement, “Being [you] is the mother of the myriad things”, turns forward, involving heaven, earth and the myriad things facing forward, and spreading out heaven and earth.  Mother has the meaning of “formal ground”.  When explaining philosophical principles, the Chinese like to use concrete terms and symbolic metaphors, such as mother.  The myriad things in you give birth, nurture, erect, and strengthen, and within the sphere of Being grow and undergo transformation; hence you is the mother-ground, or formal basis, of the myriad things growing and undergoing transformation.  As soon as there is Being, Being has a want-orientation, and that orientation reaching here and being actualized results in a thing.  You, Being, is thus the ground by which a thing can be actualized.

Looking backward, we say that Nothing is monistic, is one. Looking forward, we say that Being, that the want-orientation, is pluralistic.  Since it is pluralistic, it can be the mother, the formal ground, of the myriad things.  Lao Zi seeks to understand Dao from wu and youWu and you mixed together constitute the xuan.  The xuan of “The xuan

158

within the xuan, the door to the myriad marvels” is the ground of the creation of the myriad things.  Speaking analytically and explaining directly, you is the basis of the myriad things; speaking synthetically, wu is the beginning of heaven and earth.  It is because you issues from wu and moreover you and wu mixed into one is called the xuan that the xuan can restore the concreteness of Dao, in other words, the concrete, real function of Dao.  By stopping at either Nothing or Being Dao’s concreteness would disappear, making it impossible to restore or manifest Dao’s wondrous uses in creating heaven, earth and the myriad things.  Strictly speaking, there is ultimately only one statement, “Dao creates heaven, earth and the myriad things,” Nothing and Being all belonging to one aspect of Dao, and their opposite being heaven, earth and the myriad things. Although Being belongs to both ends, it does not come from the outside, but arises from the infinite mental state, and so the direct meaning is Nothing and Being ranged on one side and the myriad things on the opposite side.

Things are ranged opposite Nothing and Being, but once Being emerges, and there is a want-orientation, then it is directed towards a thing and drops on the thing. That is why we generally understand Daoist you by linking it with the thing.  This actually is a derivative, secondary meaning.  We should understand the primary, original meaning as you linked with wu, for you arises from wu; hence Dao has a double character, and things are not Dao’s nature.  Wu is understood as the substance of heaven, earth and the myriad things, and when there is a want-direction, a thing will be actualized and created.  People in general as soon as they speak of you explain it as dropping from want-orientation down to a thing.  Actually, in the Dao De Jing, you is the mother of the myriad things, which means, in present-day language, that it is the formal ground of things.  The formal

159

ground is always spoken of as being linked to things, which is why people ordinarily explain you as being linked to things.  In fact, you can be picked up and subsumed under wu.

This differs from the Western explanation. The Being that Westerners talk about when they discuss things cannot be picked up.  For example, Plato’s Idea, which is brought up in reference to things, does not have creativity.  Creation pertains to the Demiurge, which later becomes equivalent to God, or the Creator.  The Creator applies the Idea, this form, to matter to create a thing.  Thus Plato’s Idea belongs to the intelligible world, but the Idea itself has no creativity.  That is why when it came to Aristotle he only spoke of form and matter, criticizing Plato as transcendent, while his own universal was immanent.  If we speak in reference to things, we must ultimately drop onto the immanent.  Plato in fact only abstractly picked it up in his thought.  Strictly speaking, it cannot be picked up. Later when Heidegger discussed ontology, he also explained being in the same way.

Here to say we can pick it up is to speak in reference to Dao. Nothing and Being are the double character of Dao. You and wu combining into one to become the xuan is the concrete Dao; only thus can Dao’s creativity be restored.  If we first speak overall of the orientation of this creativity, would that not have metaphysical meaning?  This is the Daoist type of metaphysics.  And if we speak of ontology, it would be Daoist ontology, characterized by the discussion of Nothing and Being in a subjective manner.  It is precisely this that can create the object, that is a creating approach.

160

The Daoist type of metaphysics and ontology pertains to practice, in the broad meaning of the word practice.  The normal use of the word in reference to morals takes an original or narrow meaning.  The three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism all approach their teachings from spiritual cultivation.  This is practice in the broad sense of the word.  Confucian practice is moral; Buddhist practice is liberating. It is hard to find an appropriate term for Daoism; it should probably be similar to liberating, and adjectives such as untrammeled, at ease, non-dependent, roaming are all general descriptions of practice.  Because this type of metaphysics takes a subjective approach, not one concerned with existence, we have given it a name, the “*vision-based* type  [jingjie xingtai境界形態] of metaphysics”.  The metaphysics that takes an objective, ontological approach we will call the “*being-based* type [shiyou xingtai實有形態] of metaphysics”.  These are major divisions.  All Chinese metaphysics — Daoism, Buddhism, Confucianism — has a flavor of  *vision-based* metaphysics.  But Confucianism is not only concerned with a *vision-based* state, it is also concerned with objective reality; Daoism, on the other hand, only gives a *vision-based* type of metaphysics, and this is what determines its systemic difference.  Its systemic difference is shown in how it is distinct from Confucianism, Buddhism, and Western philosophy. We should note that this wisdom which differs from other systems is very special.

We are now left with the very last question.  We have just said that Nothing and Being constitute the double character of Dao.  Joined together, they constitute the xuan, and only the xuan can restore Dao’s concrete function of procreating the myriad things.  Through want-orientation, a thing is actualized, that is, procreated and manifested.  Thus want-orientation (you) is the mother of the myriad things.  Thus, it is not restricted to the

161

subjective life, for even heaven, earth and the myriad things cannot escape this sphere of Nothing and Being.  Such being the case, this is then a metaphysics, one that attempts to explain existence, but this explanation still only takes a subjective, practical approach, and is still a *vision-based* type of explanation.  It is still conspicuously different from the metaphysics of Western philosophy, which directly, objectively, and approaching from the object, explains objective reality.  The difference is a great division and can be easily distinguished.  Then let us take another look to see how it differs from Confucianism and Buddhism so that we may make finer distinctions.  All three great teachings of China are for practice, all taking the subjective approach.  If so, what accounts for the differences among Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism?  Daoism is purely a *vision-based* type of metaphysics, and the distinction between it and Confucianism and Buddhism is quite subtle. How should we understand this distinction?  The crux lies in this fourth question, which is that the xuan restores the concrete creativity of “Dao’s procreating the myriad things.”  To say procreate and create is to first for the sake of expedience make a blanket statement, so as to correspond to epistemology.  Epistemology is concerned only with cognizing the object, not with creating the object.  We must not explain Dao with an epistemological (horizontal) attitude, but should set the horizontal attitude upright and take the from-the-top-down or vertical approach to express the creativity of Dao.

The relation of the Daoist Dao to the myriad things lies in its being responsible for the existence of the myriad things.  Speaking overall, this is also creating.  Exactly what form does this creation take?  For example, “Dao procreates it, virtue nurtures it.” (Chapter 51).  So Dao also procreates!  Zhuang Zi also said: “It procreates heaven,

162

procreates earth, inspirits the demons, inspirits the gods.” (“Da Zong Shi [The Great Ancestral Teacher]” chapter).  Even heaven and earth must be procreated by Dao, much less the myriad things.  Dao De Jing also says: “All the myriad things under heaven are born of Being [you], Being is born of Nothing [wu].” Does this not clearly use the word sheng,procreate?  That is why to use the present-day words of chuangsheng, procreate, and chuangzao, create, cannot be counted wrong.  However, if you wish to advance a step further in understanding, then you will realize that it is not altogether appropriate to use the term create. Even though we use the word sheng, procreate, the Daoist explanation of this sheng is actually “The procreating that does not procreate.”  In Confucianism, it is simply procreate [chuangsheng].  The Doctrine of the Mean says: “The Way of heaven and earth can be encompassed in one word:  In making things it does not waver, and therefore in procreating things it is unfathomable.”  That Dao procreates the myriad things, and has a positive procreative function.  The Dao of Daoism, strictly speaking, does not have this meaning. Consequently, the procreating that does not procreate becomes a *vision-based* type of metaphysics.  The crux of the *vision-based* type of metaphysics lies here.

Thus it is appropriate to apply the words creativity and creation to Confucianism, but they cannot be applied to Daoism.  At the most we can make a general statement to the effect that they can be responsible for the existence of things, that is, enable things to actualize.  “Actualize” is more general; to say “created” would be too concrete.  So we should not speak of a creating principle, but should rather call it a principle of actualization.  Actualization can take many forms.  The Christian God creating the myriad things is one meaning, whereby the mythology of creation is a form of explaining

163

God’s creation of the myriad things out of Nothing.  Another meaning of actualization is found in the Confucian account of “Heavenly Dao without end” [tiandao bu yi天道不已] procreating the myriad things.  That is not creating out of Nothing, but a functional creation of “Speaking in wonder of the myriad things.”  Both schools of teaching speak of creation, though differently, but both can explain it using the principle of actualization.  Buddhism cannot use the word creation at all, for to say nirvana and dharmakāya [the Dharma-body] or to say prajña [wisdom] procreating the myriad dharmas [things] would not make sense.  Even to say actualizes would be inappropriate.  But when we come to Perfect Doctrine [yuan jiao], we can at least maintain the necessity of “the existence of dharmas.”  If we are compelled to say “actualize”, it would be the “actualize” of the Tiantai school’s statement “When li 理 [noumenon, Principle] is present, shi事 [phenomenon, event] actualizes.”  “Actual” in actualize means necessarily manifest together.  Thus no matter whether it is the Christian God, the Confucian Dao [daoti], the Daoist xuan [the Dark, profound, mysterious], or the Buddhist prajña [wisdom] and dharmakāya [Dharma-body], if we speak in blanket terms, the principle of actualization can be applied to them all.  But the meaning of “actualization” in each case is different, especially in Buddhism.  This is a very subtle question.  We will now talk about it in this simple fashion, but later on we will have a chance to discuss it in greater detail.

We can only say in general terms that Daoism discusses the principle of actualization, but we cannot particularize it and say creation.  Hence Daoism is a *vision-based* type of doctrine.  If we want to say a bit more, add some color to our statement, then should we determine it to be God, or the Confucian Dao, or prajñā and dharmakāya?  The Dao De Jing makes no such determination, being content with the one

164

word xuan.  In regard to the meaning of this word, I also maintain that Daoism is the most philosophical and formal of philosophies, making no special determination on the principle of actualization.  If one determined it to be Brahman, God, or the “Oh, how majestic” mandate of heaven, Dao, etc., these would be regarded by Daoists as a special determination on the principle of actualization, and strictly speaking would have a special want-orientation.  Daoism has made no such determination, which is why it is the most philosophical and evinces more than the other philosophies both the universality and, one might say, the emptiness and abstraction of logic. The “procreate” of the xuan procreating heaven, earth and the myriad things is “The procreating that does not procreate”.  If you understand the procreating that does not procreate, then you will be able to understand everything that has been discussed before.  This is very subtle.  If you read the Dao De Jing a bit you will know, and if you look at it carefully you will see, that this is very deep wisdom.

It is from the procreating-that-does-not-procreate that we can speak of the *vision-based* type of metaphysics.  For if it is indeed procreating then that would be a *being-based* type of metaphysics.  For example, if the Dao of the Confucian “Heaven’s command has no end” actually has the ontological function of procreating the myriad things, it would become an objective reality, a creative reality. The Daoist Dao is Nothing.  This Nothing gives rise to a want-orientation.  From want-orientation the procreation of the myriad things is explained.  Thus we cannot first objectively say that there is something called Nothing in the objective world that is going to procreate the myriad things.  Instead we have to pull in and approach it subjectively. We must depend on our mental-state-of-infinite-marvelous-uses to have at any moment a want-orientation,

165

and through the want-orientation explain the existence of objective things.  It is moreover a procreating that does not procreate, and is explained negatively.  Previously we have said that the want-orientation has no object, and that Nothing itself can generate it.  Explaining creativity in this way is easier to understand, and the writing of a composition has been used to explain creation.  When you and wu are merged into one to become the xuan, we speak of the manifestation of its operation in concrete life, together with this world.  The world cannot be pushed aside temporarily in order that we may talk only of the source of creation.  Analytically speaking, although it is of course transcendent, Dao is also immanent.  Only when it is both transcendent and immanent can it be concrete Dao.  This is characteristic of all Eastern thought.  Since it is immanent, the concrete operation of that Dao must be discussed together with the myriad things [the phenomenal world]. That is, it must be linked with the myriad things being procreated by means of the want-orientation. This then is the procreating that does not procreate.  If Dao’s creativity is explained to you without linking it to the myriad things and if the want-orientation is explained completely from Nothing, your understanding of it would be only an initial analytical understanding, a temporary expedient.  A complete and full explanation would be to say that the xuan, which is Nothing and Being joined into one, is the mother, the ground, of the myriad things.  All things issue from this, “The xuan of the xuan, the door to the multitudinous marvels”.  We can also speak of the want-orientation of Dao without heaven, earth and the myriad things; that would be the creation of the myriad things in the manner of Christianity.  Even the Confucians take an approach different from this, for the Confucian creation is one in which “speaking with wonder of the myriad things” operates; hence it also must be explained together with the myriad things.  Although the

166

concrete marvelous uses of the Daoist Dao, which is the xuan, must also be discussed together with heaven, earth and the myriad things, here we are talking about procreating, where the meaning of creating is not prominent.  Moreover, procreating is the procreating that does not procreate. This is the original, real Daoist meaning.

What does the procreating that does not procreate mean? This is a negative or passive explanation [xiaoji, negative, passive]. of the function of procreating. Wang Bi [226-249]’s annotation grasps the meaning admirably. In Daoism, the activity of procreating is actually explained as things being born and growing of themselves. Why does Daoism say “ Dao procreates it, virtue nurtures it?”  Why do we also say that it is a passive meaning? There is a wisdom here, a twist.  Wang Bi’s annotation says: “Not restricting its nature, not blocking its source.”  In this way, it can arise and grow of itself.  In “Not restricting its nature”, restricting means to check and control, not moving along with its own nature, but on the contrary to check and control, distort, and damage its own nature, as a result of which it will not be able to live and grow.  “Not blocking its source” means to throw open the source and let it flow freely and then it will flow on its own.  This is a very great feat on the part of Nothing.  If this can come about, then it would be the same as procreating it, although in fact it was born of itself.  This is what is meant by the procreating that does not procreate, which has a passive meaning.

According to this meaning, Daoism is the most anti-communist kind of philosophy, one very much in accord with the spirit of liberalism.  Communism is intent on “restricting its nature, blocking its source.”  Because everything is blocked dead, the communist society is a closed society.  Liberalism has to promote an open society.  The Chinese Communists have herded people into people’s communes where no freedom is

167

allowed.  If even what they eat is allotted, would not society be stifled to death?  This is what is meant by “Restricting its nature, blocking its source”.  It is absolutely inimical to Dao, devoid of Dao.  This is where Daoism talks about Dao, about wu wei, not doing *[anything against nature[*, being natural, and where it talks about the Nothing and Being of Dao.  This is the perspective from which it talks about procreation being the procreating that does not procreate.  This represents a huge feat, for people always want to push forward to control and grip.  Now you are asked to take a step back.  Wouldn’t that be extremely difficult?  Taking a step back is the mark of an open society, for once you control and grip, then it is sealed dead.  The Communists now [1978] on the Chinese Mainland is simply enabling us to understand the truth of Daoism and to realize that this is the wisest of positions.  Daoism long ago saw the why and wherefore of the disasters that have befallen us.  This is how those xuan statements can be understood.

(Mou’s Lecture 5 in Chinese was transcribed and edited by Yi-hsien Hu.)

English translation copytight©Julie Lee Wei, all rights reserved.

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san) Nineteen Lectures, Lecture 3, Excerpts

[The following is  excerpted from Mou Zongsan, Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy中國哲學十九講, Lecture 3, “The Emphasis in Chinese Philosophy and the Question of the Pre-Qin Philosophers”, translated by Julie Lee Wei.  The translation was authorized by Mrs. Mou Zongsan through the Foundation for the Study of Chinese Philosophy and Culture (FSCPC).  English words supplied by Mou himself are underlined. Lecture 3 was translated in 2000. Copyright©Julie Lee Wei, all rights reserved.]

81

How did Confucius view the Zhou culture?    His attitude was positive, ritual being always necessary.  Whatever the period, a society will always need ritual.  Confucius believed that the rituals instituted by the Duke of Zhou were in his time still useful.  Of course they could be contracted or expanded with prudence but you ought not to radically overturn them.  So his attitude was positive.  However, it was through his re-vitalization of the Zhou rites that he came to develop what is called Confucian thought.  For it was not that the Zhou rituals were without objective validity because of intrinsic flaws, but rather that they had lost effectiveness because the nobles were corrupt and degenerate and unable to carry the weight of the ritual and music.  Corruption undermined their ability to uphold these rituals, and if they could not practice them, would not the Zhou rituals then become empty?  Because they became empty, they became mere form, became so-called formalism.  The Mohists and Daoists looked upon them as mere form and thus wanted to negate them.  Confucius knew that the corruption of the nobility made the Zhou ritual empty, but he wanted to re-vitalize it.  The Confucian attitude was that to make the Zhou ritual valid, it had to be first revivified.  And how was it to be revivified?  Confucius brought out the word ren [humane, humaneness, humanity] and hence the statement, “’The ritual, the ritual’, they say.  Does it only mean jades and silks?  ‘The music, the

82

music’, they say. Does it only mean bells and drums?” and “If men are not ren, what use is ritual?  If men are not ren, what use is music?” and the like.  So we see that ritual and music must have real meaning, must have value.  You must have real life and real life lies in this ren.  That is why the idea of ren is brought out to make ritual and music authentic, to give it life, to invest it with objective validity.  With this, the problem emerges, and it does not lie in the ritual and music.  Ritual and music can be improved a bit, that is no problem, for the Sage is neither conservative nor obdurate.  Following the times, ritual may be contracted or expanded, for this was done in the Three Dynasties.  “The Yin following the Xia ritual, what they subtracted or added can be known.  The Zhou following the Yin ritual, what they subtracted or added can be known.  As to the successors to the Zhou, even after a hundred generations, it can be known.” (Analects 2.23).  This is subtracting and adding, on which Confucius has spoken clearly.  Thus the Confucians were not diehard conservatives “clinging to the remains, and guarding the tatters” of the Zhou ritual.  The Zhou ritual was not impracticable in itself, for if you yourself had real life, it would be practicable.  The most important thing was to revive men’s lives, and when the question arrived at this juncture, it became Confucian thought.  That is why, from this point of view, Confucian thought opened up the path to the fountainhead of values, and set upright the moral subject.  In this respect no one could surpass the Confucians.  In speaking of opening up the path to the fountainhead of values, we mean by values moral values, the values of life.

The Confucian contribution to mankind came about when it began to reflect on the culture of the Three Dynasties, and when such reflection led to the idea of ren.  With the emergence of the idea, principles also emerged, and when principles emerged they

83

determined the direction of man’s life.  Confucianism therefore is a great doctrine.  I have often described this great doctrine in these words:  “In opening the path to the fountainhead of values, in raising upright the moral subject, none have surpassed the Confucians.”  Here is the essential meaning of why Confucians are Confucians.  Hence in their teaching they do not turn outside to speak, they speak directly from here.  They do not take a detour and speak from God, nor do they speak from [the Buddhist]“dependent-origination substance-empty [yuan-qi xing-kong]”.  They do not go outside but speak directly from this ren.  This indeed is greatness, ordinary but profound.  For people’s mentality is always turning outward.  Herein is the greatness of Confucian teaching, whereby it helps human beings rise to their feet again.  That is why in discussing Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, I describe Confucianism with the words:  “In opening up the path to the fountainhead of values, in raising upright the moral subject, none surpasses the Confucians.”  And Daoism?  “In discerning change, none can surpass the Daoists.”

Although Daoism has spoken abundantly on xuan {Dark, i.e., profound] principles and xuan thought, their main effect is to discern reversal, to apprehend the crux of change.  The Daoists are able to see clearly the situation of the times and discern critical change, Zhang Liang [c.189 BCE] being a quintessential example.  It is not that the Confucians do not understand critical change, but that they also have a fundamental spirit that does not allow them merely to move along with critical change.  The Confucians cannot merely apprehend critical change, they also have a question of right and wrong, they also have moral judgement.  Without moral judgement, without right and wrong, once the situation deteriorated, would they not become opportunists?  Even if not

84

opportunists, they could flee into the deep mountains in search of seclusion.  Didn’t the Daoists do that?  But no.  That is why in past history when times deteriorated, only the Confucians were able to be fully responsible and to stay the course.  In times of peril, only the Confucians were able to stand as the upright column in the rushing stream.  To take refuge in seclusion is not enough.  And what about the Buddhists?  “In discerning karma, none can surpass the Buddhists.”  That is to speak in comparison with Christians.  Christianity teaches sin and original sin through myths.  It speaks of sin every day, but after all its teaching, people are still not always sure what sin is.  Buddhism teacheskarma and ignorance, pushing aside original sin step by step, which is to say “In discerning karma, none can surpass the Buddhists.”

Let us move on to Mohism.  What was Mo Zi’s attitude toward Zhou ritual?  Mo Zi’s attitude toward Zhou ritual was one of negation.  Mo Zi’s teaching viewed Zhou ritual from the standpoint of utilitarianism.  He was therefore in favor of rejecting Confucianism, rejecting music, in favor of frugal burials, and so forth. Thus Xun Zi [fl. 298-238 BCE] criticized Mo Zi [c. 479-381 BCE] with the words “He elevates utility, exhalts frugality, and belittles gradations and degrees.” (Mo Zi, “Rejection of the Twelve Masters” chapter).  To elevate utility means that Mo Zi looked upon utility as of the highest importance; to exhalt frugality and despise gradations and degrees means that he regarded frugality as of the greatest importance, belittling the gradations of qinqin [treating kin as kin]and the degrees of zunzun [according respect to those deserving respect].  Mo Zi’s thought was very shallow, with no understanding of the gradations of qinqin and degrees in zunzun.  The rank-distinctions of qinqin and zunzun are the ranks of values, which should be preserved.  They are not the classes that the Communists talk

85

about. These are ranks. Ranks and classes are not the same.  For example, in the military there are such ranks as lieutenants and colonels.  In schools there are professors, associate professors, lecturers, teaching assistants, all of them ranks, not classes.  But when the Communist Party talks about struggle, it confounds classes with ranks, saying that professors, associate professors and lecturers are the ruling class and students are the class being ruled.  They even go so far as to apply it to their family, saying parents are the ruling class and children the class being ruled.  All rubbish.  The gradations of qinqin and of zunzun are ranks, are value concepts, determined by a person’s talent, morals, and the closeness or distance in filial duty.  These are not classes.  Mo Zi did not understand these gradations in qinqin or degrees in zunzun, as a result of which he descended into a simple and roughhewn utilitarianism.  He regarded the Zhou ritual as being convoluted and wasteful; hence he did not want to take Zhou as a model, but rather wanted to hold as models the Xia and Xia Yu [founder of the Xia dyn.].  That is why Mr. Tang Junyi [1909-78] once said that Mo Zi was sub-humanist, sub meaning not reaching, not arriving, at the necessity of humanist values; and therefore from the standpoint of utilitarianism he rejected humanism.  In speaking of culture, we cannot adopt utiliarianism completely, for if we were to view culture completely from the standpoint of whether something is useful or not, the results would be awful.  For then many things in our life would have to be removed.

Now let us take a look at Daoism.  What was the Daoist attitude toward Zhou ritual?  The Daoists also negated the Zhou ritual, but not from the standpoint of utilitarianism.  Behind Daoist thought there was a fundamental insight, namely freedom and being at ease [ziyou zizai].  That is why it looked upon Zhou ritual as empty ritual, as formalism.

86

Consequently, it regarded all of Zhou ritual as something external.  The Confucians did not regard Zhou ritual as external, and hence they said: “The three hundred rules of ceremony, the three thousand rules of demeanour, did not descend from heaven, did not issue from the earth,” but is based on human nature, human feelings.  In this case they are not completely external but have roots in human nature.  But this point could not be seen by Daoism.  It only saw Zhou ritual as hollow ritual, as external, and hence fetters and shackles to our life, preventing us from being free and at ease.  At the back of Daoism’s fundamental spirit is a search for a lofty freedom and ease.  Its freedom is not license, not the freedom appearing in the world today.  Rather, it is a high-level cultivation.  Hence Daoism talks about roaming, the equalization of things, and non-dependence.   Because he saw Zhou ritual as hollow ritual, as external, Lao Zi said: “Therefore, after you lose Dao, you get virtue, after you lose virtue, you get humaneness [ren]; after you lose humaneness, you get duty [yi ]; after you lose duty, you get ritual [li].  Ritual is the slighting of loyalty and trust, and the head of rebellion.” (Lao Zi, chapter 38).

Zhuang Zi [c.369-c.286 BCE] even more conspicuously looked upon Zhou ritual as external and hollow ritual.  He made several elegant statements on this.  In the “Tianzi Fang [Sir Square Field]” chapter he says:  “The people of the Central Kingdom are enlightened on ritual and propriety and uncouth in understanding the human heart and mind.  Formerly, the people who saw me were, in entering and retiring, here completely proper, there completely decorous; in moving with dignity, they were here like a dragon, there like a tiger.”  To him the people of China were utterly proper when it came to ritual and decorum, but towards the human heart and mind they lacked understanding.  This human heart and mind is not the moral mind and nature discussed by Confucianism but

87

refers to the freedom and ease of the mind [xin-jing].  Zhuang Zi maintained that the lives of these people were by no means free, their spirits not liberated, and they were unable to be free and at ease.  This was how he looked at the Zhou ritual, in a way different from Mo Zi, even though the Daoists likewise adopted a negative attitude towards Zhou ritual.  Mr. Tang Junyi has said that Daoism is supra-humanist.  While Moism is sub-humanist, Daoism exceeds and stands above humanism, transcending humanism and opening up a new vision.

Finally, let us look at Legalism.  How does Legalism regard Zhou ritual?  Legalism also holds a negative attitude toward Zhou ritual.  But it does not negate it in the same way as Mo Zi; nor does it open up another vision like Daoism.  The Legalist attitude is very pragmatic.  It has a thoroughly political perspective, making judgements from the perspective of success.  Confucianism turned the Zhou ritual around to ren, establishing a noble doctrine, opening up the fountainhead of values.  However, it was unable to solve the problems of the day, which is why people described Confucianism as quixotic.  Nor did people heed those teachings of Mencius during his time.  For the purpose of solving the problems of the time, the most practical and practicable was Legalism.  Mo Zi’s preachings didn’t work; Daoism’s preachings didn’t work.  What Legalism focused on were contemporary problems.  At a time when the structure of society and politics was undergoing transition, the Legalists followed this structural transition and pressed forward, conforming their actions to this transitional trend.  The structural transition in politics and in society we speak of here is not a generalization, but can be described in concrete terms.  You can’t just make general statements such as society developing problems, the people suffering.  If so, what kind of a society was the aristocratic society

88

of the time?  The political structure was feudalist.  The economic structure was that of the well-field system.  These had to be liberated, a task undertaken by Legalism.  Legalism followed the contemporary trend of societal structure undergoing transition to complete this structural transition.  This was moving with the trend to achieve its philosophy.  Because Confucianism, Mohism, and Daoism did not achieve their philosophy by moving with the trend, their contributions could only be in the spiritual life.  Towards the politics and economics of their day they made hardly any contribution.

Because Legalism sought to accomplish the structural transition by moving along with the changing times, their first step was to strike at the nobility.  Consequently the Legalists had to clash with the nobles, engaging in a life and death struggle.  However, once they did this, those who were emperors *[rulers]* rejoiced, and so they all employed the Legalists.  There was Li Ke [fl.5th cent. BCE], who became prime minister of Wei [403-241 BCE]; later Wu Qi [fl.5th cent. BCE] was prime minister of Chu [740-330 BCE], Shang Yang [died 338 BCE] was prime minister of Qin [897-221 BCE].  Thus employed, they all clashed with the nobility.  To strike at the nobility, it was necessary to abolish the feudal system and to turn the land granted to the nobles into commanderies and prefectures [jun xian], political units subordinate to the national government.  This was a step of progress, namely the abolition of the feudal system and the establishment of commanderies and prefectures.  Commanderies and prefectures were objective political units whereas the fiefs of the nobles were not, the fiefs belonging to the nobles as private individuals.  Then there was the removal of the well-field system.  Only when the well-field system was abolished could the farmer obtain private ownership.  This is where private ownership began. Once he had private ownership, then the farmer could enjoy

89

freedom, and only then could he be an independent being not belonging to the noble.  All these steps represented progress.  This then was the work of the Legalists: striking at the nobility, abolition of the feudal system and establishment of commanderies and prefectures, and the abolition of the well-field system, these three measures.  In the Philosophy of History I have recounted it in detail, and it would be well for you to look into it.  This was the sort of work Shang Yang did in the state of Qin, the result of which he was sacrificed.  Wu Qi in the state of Chu was also sacrificed.  When Li Ke was in the state of Wei, it was just the beginning of Legalism, and besides he did not do much and did not engage in too big a clash with the nobility, so he was spared.  These were all able men, all with a strong sense of reality and by no means quixotic scholars.  Li Ke was a student of Zi Xia [a disciple of Confucius], Wu Qi a student of Zeng Zi [a late follower of Confucius].  Both came out of the Confucian school, but in the end both became Legalists.  Legalists like them were not bad men; they were practical men of action.  At a time when the structure of society was undergoing transition they grasped the opportunity to accomplish this transition.  Moving with the times, they were able to succeed, at the sacrifice of their own lives.  Legalists of this kind were not evil men.  Shang Yang was the model of a Legalist; Li Ke and Wu Qi were a prelude to the Legalists.  The common phrase “Guan, Shang, Shen, Han” links Guan Zhong with Shang Yang, making Guan also a Legalist, which is not true.  Guan Zhong cannot be considered a Legalist; he was a great statesman.  When we speak of the great statesmen of Chinese history, Guan Zhong was the first of them.  He was one of those rare figures of history, supremely intelligent, supremely wise, and possessed of great political acumen.  That is why in the two hundred years of the Spring and Autumn period, Duke Huan of Qi’s dominance over the empire was unequalled, for it was through the counsels of Guan Zhong that he became overlord

90

of the Five Hegemons.  We can only look upon Guan Zhong as a statesman, not a Legalist.

If we say that Legalists like Li Ke, Wu Qi, and Shang Yang were not bad men, then which Legalists and at what point became bad?  Legalists became bad during the period from Shen Buhai [d. 337 BCE] to Han Fei [281-233 BCE].  We can’t really say that discussing law is bad, can we, for without objective law there can be no real governance, and therefore law cannot be regarded as evil.  Even the Sage cannot object to law, except that he rarely discussed it.  This may be because during his time he did not notice this problem; but if you were to point it out to him, even the Sage could not object to law.  But when Shen Buhai started to talk about shu artfulness [technique], then it became a problem.  When it came to Han Fei, he merged the law of Shang Yang with the artfulness of Shen Buhai, adding his own thought, and this is where it got bad.  This kind of Legalism, which is abhorrent, is precisely the Legalism venerated by the present-day [1978] Communists.

Why do we say that with the addition of artfulness [shu] it became bad?  We said that law in itself is not something bad; this we all recognize.  But it depends on what principles, on what spirit you base that law.  This Legalism was based on the artfulness that was taught by Shen Buhai.  And where did the artfulness of Shen Buhai come from?  It came from the Daoists.  When Legalism united with Daoism, Daoism changed in nature, while Legalism got bad.  Law is objective, proclaimed from the government palace, publicized to society.  Where then is this artfulness to be used?  At the locus of the emperor.  This is a secret den, a place I call the Kremlin.  Residing at the place of the emperor, artfulness cannot be made public.  It is a fundamental dynamic force hidden

91

behind the operation of the law.  And this artfulness is none other than being “unfathomable in reward and punishment, unfathomable in pleasure and displeasure,” that is, being inscrutable in pleasure and displeasure.  Because the use of this artfulness also required great cultivation, Daoism had to be dragged in.  Later on all those great emperors understood this sort of thing, the one who evinced it most clearly being Emperor Yong Zheng [reigned 1723-36] of the Qing dynasty.  But Yong Zheng was not a student of Daoism; he was a student of Chan [Zen] Buddhism, which made it even worse, for that also ruined Chan Buddhism.  From the perspective of his own personal subjective cultivation, Yong Zheng reached an admirable understanding of Chan Buddhism.  But when he used that understanding to rule the great empire, it resulted in the sort of thing that Li Si [fl.221-213 BCE] and Han Fei practiced, a regime that was cold, sinister, and cruel.  This is where Legalism turned bad.  When Legalism reached Shen Buhai, Han Fei, Li Si and the emperor Shih Huang [r.221-209 BCE] of the Qin, it became a great evil.  Li Si said to the emperor Shi Huang [First Emperor] of Qin: “Make law the teaching, make the functionary the teacher.”  This was a great evil; never before had anyone dared utter such words.  This was trashing the human being.  He did not look upon the human being as a person; he merely looked upon the people as tools for farming or for war.  As a result, the Qin dynasty promptly collapsed [209 BCE].  After that no one dared openly declare that they would employ Legalist thought, although they might furtively steal a little bit for use.  But no one dared publicly uphold Legalism as his doctrine.  When the Communist Party appeared, they did not say they were employing Legalism.  Instead they used a new terminology, things like Marxism, Communism, and so on, which actually mean the same.  Doesn’t Communism also use law as their teaching?  They use Marxism, historical materialism, dialectical materialism, class struggle, and so on as their

92

doctrine.  They also use the functionary as teacher, the functionary in this case being the cadre.

We said earlier that Legalism emerged to complete the structural transition that was taking place at the time, resulting in the striking down of government by the nobility and the establishment of an autocratic monarchy.  This was a great advance in the history of China.  Hence the political structure advanced from its beginnings as government by the nobility to rule by an autocratic monarchy.  The autocratic monarchy lasted more than two thousand years, bringing us now to democratic rule.  As I see it democratic rule is the ultimate form.  Political structure does not have many structural transformations, merely these three.  With those two having passed away, only democracy has the ability to endure and only it has universality.

(Copyright©Julie Lee Wei, all rights reserved.)

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san), Nineteen Lectures: English Translation, Table of Contents

CONTENTS

Author’s Preface

Translator’s Preface and Acknowledgement

Lecture 1       The Special Character of Chinese Philosophy

Lecture 2       Two Kinds of Truth and the Difference in their Universality

Lecture 3       The Emphasis in Chinese Philosophy and The Question of the Origins of the Pre-Qin Philosophers

Lecture 4       The Character of the Confucian System

Lecture 5       The Metaphysics, Xuan Principles, of Daoism

Lecture 6       The Character of the System of Xuan Principles—Horizontal Discussion of the Vertical

Lecture 7       The Functional Representation of Dao

Lecture 8       The Rise and Progress of Legalism

Lecture 9       The Legalists: The Significance of their Political Innovations

Lecture 10       The Pre-Qin School of Names and their Thought

Lecture 11       The Principal Issues in Wei-Jin Metaphysics, Xuanxue, And their Metaphysical Content and Value

Lecture 12       Non-Mainstream Thought of the Wei, Jin, and Liang Dynasties, And the Philosophical Significance of Buddhist “Dependent-Origination Substance-Empty”:  A Brief Discussion

Lecture 13       Two Truths and Three Substances:  How Do We Place Science?

Lecture 14       “One Mind Opens Two Doors” in the Awakening of Faith In the Mahayana

Lecture 15       The Meaning of Perfect Teaching in Buddhism

Lecture 16       Analytical Discourse and Non-Analytical Discourse and “Expressing Perfect Teaching”

Lecture 17       Perfect Teaching and the Perfect Good

Lecture 18       An Outline of Song and Ming Confucianism

Lecture 19       The Perfection and Ripeness of the Vertical System

(English translation copyright©Julie Lee Wei)

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san), Nineteen Lectures: English Translation, A Note (2)

A Note (Summary) from Julie Wei

The complete English translation (approx. 650 pages) by Julie Lee Wei of Mou Zongsan’s Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy was authorized by Mrs. Mou Zongsan through FSCPC (Foundation for the Study of Chinese Philosophy and Culture) in 1997. FSCPC provided partial funding for the translation. Wei was not hired or commissioned by FSCPC.

By 2000, Wei had translated all nineteen lectures. By the beginning of 2003, Wei had translated all the endnotes. Esther Su, a student of Mou and co-founder and co-director of FSCPC, read Wei’s translations at various stages and provided some input. This has been properly acknowledged in Wei’s Acknowledgement (see Table of Contents).

In 2000-2003, three leading scholars of Chinese philosophy were sent copies of the translation; one read three chapters of the translation, another read all 19 lectures (without endnotes), a third read all 19 lectures together with all the endnotes. All praised it and wanted to see it published. In November 2003 Esther Su wrote Wei a letter saying Wei’s “word-by-word translation” was not publishable and Wei had to be replaced by one or more persons more qualified who would re-write Wei’s translation, and that Wei would have to agree to a new contract adding the person(s). Su also wrote that Wei’s manuscript would be used as a first draft, and be completely overhauled. After Su refused Wei’s request to send the manuscript to a publisher (two major publishers were interested in the ms.) to be judged whether it was publishable, Wei canceled the contract with Su. Since 2003, Su and FSCPC have refused to release the Permission to allow the manuscript to be published. Wei has repeatedly offered to include Su’s name on the title page as co-translator as courtesy, but this has been rejected by Su.

From 2001 to 2012, ten leading scholars of Chinese and/or Western philosophy have deemed the translation worthy of publication. From 2004 to 2012, seven of them have written and/or spoken at length personally to Esther Su and/or other directors of FSCPC requesting them to allow the manuscript to be published. As of now, they have refused to release the permission.

I am deeply grateful to the scholars who, despite being all extremely busy people, have taken the time to concern themselves with this matter and have appealed personally to Esther Su and/or other FSCPC directors to release permission for the publication of the manuscript.

Mou Zongsan is recognized as one of the greatest philosophers of modern China, yet none of his books are as yet available in English.—Julie Wei ###

Rev. Feb. 18, 2013

Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san), Nineteen Lectures: English Translation, A Note (3)

December 22, 2012

[The follow is excerpted from a note posted June 20, 2012, on Warp, Weft, and Way, a group blog on Chinese and comparative philosophy.--jlw]

FSCPC (see their 2006 website) consisted of 6 directors 董事, 5 of whom are former students of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. This small number of Mou’s students has been blocking publication of my translation since 2004. The translation of two chapters of Mou’s Nineteen Lectures by Yi-hsien Hu seen on FSCPC’s website (Hu was/is a director of FSCPC, per 2006 website) is based on, and derived from, my full translation, without my permission.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.